Zlatko Zigic at the International Summit for a Future Beyond UNRWA

Zlatko Zigic, Served at UN Migration Agency, 1997-2017, including as Chief of Diplomatic Mission in Moscow & Regional Coordinator for Central Asia.

 

Full Written Remarks:

Thank you for everything that you are doing.

I have to begin by recognizing that UN Secretary General Guterres’ and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini’s premise that UNRWA is irreplaceable is simply put – wrong and it does not represent truth.

Gaza has a population of 2.1 million. UNRWA lists 1.7 million of them as refugees – people who have lived in Gaza for generations, under Egyptian, Israeli, and then Hamas control.

This is an absurd statistic intended to advance a political agenda, not reflect reality.

This agency, where it is hard to distinguish agency employees from someone that works for/supports Hamas or PIJ or Iranians, today claims 5.6 million people as refugees. That is simply false. There were 800,000 refugees in 1948. How could that number have grown to such an extent while the population in question aged and died?

The UN’s inflated statistic comes from the fact that it counts as a refugee anyone with a paternal ancestor who fled the territory of Mandatory Palestine in 1947 or 1948, whereas when dealing with any other conflict, neither the UN nor international law consider refugee status heritable.

In other words: less than 5% of those on UNRWA registry are refugees. This means UNRWA is not a refugee agency, but something else entirely.

(Today, UNRWA’s clients are Palestinians trapped in the label of refugee – Palestinians who are forced to internalize that label and get brought up with the hatred and resentment that comes with that label’s political and economic limitations.

With that label comes a vision – a manifesto – that one day the Jews will be driven into the Mediterranean Sea – and all these so-called “refugees” will return to their land.

Put simply, UNRWA raises children to internalize the genocidal approach in which they will be perpetrators of the genocide.

In that respect, October 7 was the logical conclusion of UNRWA’s indoctrination.

The education materials UNRWA provides Palestinian children is a crucial element of that genocidal indoctrination.)

But even though UNRWA calls them refugees and teaches them how to internalize that label, again they are by no means refugees.

Therefore UNRWA is not a refugee agency.

What should we call it? A welfare entitlement agency? A make-work or temporary employment project for Palestinians? A substitute for Palestinian institution-building, self-responsibility, and self-sufficiency? We can call it any of these. But it’s definitely not a refugee agency.

Since we established that UNRWA is not a refugee agency, and since there are estimates by credible intelligence and open sources (both in the U.S. and in the EU) that approximately 200,000 Arabs displaced in 1948 are still alive and most others are not refugees by any rational criteria, they could be internally displaced, but not refugees, that means that despite what UN Secretary General Guterres is saying, UNRWA could be relatively quickly replaced by a system of other UN and humanitarian agencies and NGOs.

(First, since most people registered with UNRWA are citizens or permanent residents of another country—such as Jordan—or currently reside within the borders of Palestinian Authority, donor parliaments should work with donor governments to find bilateral solutions with, for example Jordan and PA. America, or EU, for example, can still assist the remaining 200,000 refugees while supporting others outside the UNRWA framework. Those people that are internally displaced or stateless and registered with UNRWA, actually fall under UNHCR’s mandate.)

I would need to elaborate more on the issues related to problems of UNRWA corruption and UNRWA terrorism problem, as well as the issues related to no accountability of UNRWA and to problems related to non existent counterterrorism vetting of UNRWA programming, personal, and curriculums, and I have prepared a paper where I elaborated all these points in detail, so with Hillel’s permission we could publish this for your perusal after this Summit.

The question that comes across is: Would replacing UNRWA with a different agencies not lead to similar problems, if the staff remain the same people? The answer is yes, and that is why I stress the importance of vetting and I will make a couple of subtle points in a couple of minutes.

The problem is that whenever the UN operates in a totalitarian zone that’s controlled by a totalitarian regime (for example in Russia or in Iran) or by terrorist group (as is the case in Gaza where Hamas was the government) the UN naturally gets infiltrated and subverted (I would be happy to testify how this happened in a mission that I headed). The same case would happen here not least since the UNRWA has a terrorism problem because it is structured to have one.

The United Nations does not recognize Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) as terrorist groups – even though each one is designated by the United States, EU and UK as a foreign terrorist organization. UNRWA is a UN-mandated agency, so UNRWA does not recognize these groups as terrorist organizations, either.

In other words to UNRWA, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are political identifiers. And UNRWA makes clear it doesn’t discriminate based on politics. And since we’ve clearly established that UNRWA is not an international organization – but a de facto local welfare agency that employs 30,000 Palestinians to provide benefits to millions more – it is guaranteed that UNRWA employs, contracts with, and provides benefits to members of designated foreign terrorist organizations and their families.

Nonetheless, replacing UNRWA would be a huge gain, because the essence of UNRWA is the narrative that the war of 1948 is not over and so UNRWA is simply perpetuating that conflict.

What will happen in Gaza, at the end of the day, will depend on how fast Hamas is destroyed and who is in control afterward. But I want to stress that in an ideal world, there shouldn’t be any UN agency in Gaza or in the West Bank or elsewhere. An Israel-friendly government consisted of non-radicalized Palestinians  should one day run Gaza themselves, the world should help them, and they should develop like a normal society.

In other words, the only thing that will give Gaza a future is to root out the terrorist culture of murdering Jews as the Palestinians goal.  And instead of looking toward the past, look to the future.

In the interim, we could have, upon Israel’s invitation a UN system (but not UNRWA) and humanitarian NGOs as a temporary solution to replace UNRWA.

However, before UNRWA is replaced by other UN agencies, humanitarian organizations and NGOs, we must demand strict conditions on any aid provided to UN organizations and other humanitarian agencies operating in Gaza and West Bank.

(No taxpayer money should go to groups that refused to recognize Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations. No taxpayer money should go to any agency whose employees and contractors – at the very least – haven’t undergone donor – that is in the first place U.S. counterterrorism and/or EU, UK etc vetting. No taxpayer money should go to any organization that operates schools, without the main donors – the United States, the EC, etc first approving the textbooks and curriculums used in those schools.

And no money should be obligated until an implementing UN agency or NGO submits to an independent beneficiary audit to root out waste, fraud, and abuse.)

(And of course one thing that definitely should not come next is the continued presence of UNRWA in any form – because it is an agency whose mandate, teachings, and propaganda inherently incite hatred of Israel, antisemitism, and terrorism. This is a moment to push the reset button and try something new – a path for Palestinians to escape the shackles of UNRWA’s phony refugee status and reach their maximum economic potential. They may finally have a chance for real peace.

Donor parliaments should block any attempt by the donor governments to include UNRWA in the future of Gaza now and especially after Hamas falls.)

Another reason why UN is saying UNRWA is irreplaceable- because Many policymakers are looking for ways to distribute aid quickly, and UNRWA’s existing infrastructure makes that the easy answer. But nothing stops us from removing UNRWA from the equation and turning over infrastructure to other UN and humanitarian agencies within their respective mandates, such as, for example, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees – which has a mandate to care for internally displaced persons, (along with in certain situations IOM).

The is rationale for is while the people living in Gaza are not refugees, they are IDPs today – giving UNHCR rather obvious jurisdiction, (possibly in collaboration with IOM). Donor parliaments and Congress could force the issue by mandating a phase-out of assistance provided to UNRWA and making money available to UNHCR and other agencies with relevant mandates instead. This would be complementary to, not in substitute of, the counterterrorism and textbook vetting requirements previously discussed.

To make a long story short on this point: to prevent further donor taxpayer dollars from subsidizing terrorism, inciting antisemitism, and denying Palestinians their basic human rights, donor parliaments, Congress and donor governments should take the following actions:

 

  1. In the U.S. modernize arcane Section 301 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit assistance to a UN agency operating in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria unless the secretary of state certifies to Congress that the United States has completed an annual counterterrorism vetting for all its employees, contractors, and beneficiaries;
  2. Prohibit further funding for UN agencies operating in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria unless the U.S. European Commission, key donor governments certify to that the donors have completed an annual beneficiary verification audit and provided the audit to the appropriate committees;
  3.  Prohibit UN agencies from using textbooks, curricula, and other education materials provided by the Palestinian Authority and instead require donor- U.S.-EC approved or provided materials to be used in their place;
  4. Prohibit aid to any UN agency unless the donor governments/ or in the case of U.S. Secretary of State, certifies that such agency recognizes Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the PFLP as terrorist organizations;
  5. Prohibit assistance to UNRWA in the emergency supplemental – make funds available for UNHRC and other applicable UN and non-UN agencies and NGOs with relevant mandates to support to IDPs instead.

 

Now as to other agencies that, in addition to UNHCR, can relatively easily and quickly replace UNRWA:

We don’t need to go too far to find an answer. We have several potentially applicable models:

1) Since the situation in Gaza is a situation of internal displacement of population, a Refugee Coordinator Model (RCM) would be recommendable:

The arrangements are set out in UNHCR’s and OCHA’s Joint Note on mixed situations: coordination in practice (2014). They were reconfirmed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the High Commissioner in 2018. The Note describes in detail the division of responsibilities between the UNHCR Representative and the Humanitarian Coordinator (currently Sigrid Kaag) in such situations.

(The High Commissioner remains accountable for protection of persons of concern; the Joint Note is about increasing operational efficiency by flexible and pragmatic organization, not about transferring accountability or responsibility. The High Commissioner’s protection responsibilities, combined with his advocacy and supervisory functions, mean that he must continue to oversee and monitor the delivery of services to displaced persons and refugees during UN responses. UNHCR’s IDP/ refugee response is an integral yet distinct element in the overall humanitarian coordination architecture.)

The RCM is applicable in all refugee and internal displacement situations and throughout a refugee/ IDP response, whether the emergency is new or protracted, and whether refugees/IDPs are living in camps, rural areas, urban settings or in mixed situations.

Now at the sector level you would not have clusters (like in a non refugee/IDP  situation, where a cluster model would be deployed) but, similarly to clusters, you would have UNHCR and other agencies within their respective mandates, in coordination with the government that should in this particular case ideally be ad interim Israeli government or a friendly Palestinian administration.

The lead agencies in different sectors would be, depending on their capacities and mandates, similar to agencies deployed in the cluster system; for example, just to give you an idea:

Emergency telecommunications, logistics: WFP

Food security: WFP and FAO

Health and nutrition: WHO and UNICEF respectively

Shelter and non food items: UNHCR as a lead (possibly with IOM)

WASH: UNICEF as a lead

Education: UNICEF as a lead (and in some cases Save the Children)

Livelihood: UNHCR together with ILO, World Bank, FAO and other agencies that are have a mandate are capacitated and whose roles are applicable to the situation

2) Cluster system that would normally be applied in non-refugee/IDP situations- for example following a major natural disaster but there are exceptions:

 

Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health and logistics, etc. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for coordination. The Resident Coordinator and/or Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) manage a humanitarian response through the clusters.

This approach would normally not be applicable while there exists a large population internal (or refugee) displacement but it can be in certain situations that I will explain shortly.

Here is a diagram depicting differences between the different systems:

And then of course we can have an example of combined systems where the donors and the government call the shots in a situation of a major crisis and where  an existing cluster system would by surged and where donors would provide support to the agencies that already have capacities on the ground.

One good example is currently the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world, a crisis of epic proportions – Sudan Complex Emergency.

Interestingly, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted to end the UN Integrated Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) on December I. The UNSC began scaling down UNITAMS operations on December 4 and plans to fully transition UNITAMS functions to other UN agencies operating in Sudan by February 29, 2024, the UN reports.

The decision follows the GoS’ November 16 letter to the UNSC requesting the termination of UNITAMS. The UN established UNITAMS in June 2020 for 12 months to assist Sudan in transitioning to democratic governance, and the UNSC renewed the mandate through December 2023.

Let’s see the scale of Sudan crisis: 

SITUATION AT A GLANCE

The number of people displaced by conflict since 15 April 2023 inside and outside of Sudan has reached 8.1 million.

24.7 MILLION Number of People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance
UN – May 2023

The U.S. as the main donor, responded with the following distribution of roles and responsibilities among the agencies on the ground based on the pre-existing cluster systems, in coordination with the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), all this from 15th April 2023 until mid December 2023:

Food security:

USAID/BHA and the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) support multiple UN agencies and NGOs to bolster food security and livelihoods throughout Sudan. In partnership with USAID/BHA, WFP provided emergency food assistance to people experiencing acute food insecurity countrywide through U.S.-sourced and locally and regionally procured cereals, pulses, and vegetable oil, as well as cash transfers for food. With support from USAID/BHA and other donors, the UN agency reached an estimated 4.8 million people across Sudan between April 15 and early December 2023.

Health:

USAID/BHA and State/PRM supported the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), WHO, and NGO partners to deliver life-saving health care across Sudan, including mobile clinics accessing hard-to-reach areas. USAID/BHA partners provides essential medicines, support health facilities, and trained implementing partners to address critical health needs. In addition, US partners–including UNFPA and UNICEF-supported essential health interventions for IDs, refugees, and other vulnerable populations in Sudan and neighboring countries.

Nutrition:

IOM, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and other USAID/BHA and State/PRM contracted partner organizations prevented, identified and treated acute malnutrition by providing nutritional supplements and conducting complementary agriculture, food security, health, and WASH activities. Between April 15 2023 and December 31 2023,

UNICEF screened 5.4 million children ages five years and younger for malnutrition and admitted more than 313,000 children for treatment of SAM in Sudan.

Protection:

USG contracted partners- including UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, and NGOs–provided conflict-affected and vulnerable people with critical protection support in Sudan and neighboring countries, including the provision of case management services and safe spaces for survivors. With support from UNICEF, 186,000 women and children accessed Gender Based Violence (GBV) prevention, risk mitigation, and response interventions in 2023. Additionally, UNFPA-supported mobile clinics provided health and GBV prevention and response services to more than 73,000 IDPs and host community members across eleven states between April 15, 2023, and February 5, 2024.

USAID/BHA also supported the UN Mine Action Service to provide critical mine risk awareness information for populations residing in or returning to conflict-affected areas potentially impacted by explosive remnants of war.

Wash:

USAID/BHA and State/PRM continued to support contracted IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, and NGOs to improve access to safe drinking water and sanitation infrastructure for crisis-affected communities across Sudan to reduce the spread of infectious diseases, such as cholera and measles. With USG and other donor support, UNICEF provided safe drinking water to an estimated 5.9 million people across Sudan between April 15 and December 31, 2023

To prevent the spread of cholera, US partners are also supporting affected and at-risk populations with emergency WASH supplies, such as chlorine for water purification, hygiene kits, and water containers.

All this was done in eighth months in circumstances of catastrophe of epic proportions.

Let me conclude:

Even though the IASC principals on 21st February 2024 called* for immediate and permanent ceasefire and for continued support to UNRWA and other humanitarian organizations operating in Gaza, a strong approach by the host Government (Israel) and by the key donors and donor organizations could lead to quick suspension of compromised UNRWA functions and lead to initiating a comprehensive humanitarian response, most likely with UNHCR as a lead and could call on IASC to activate system wide mobilization and scale up of humanitarian operational capacities (without UNRWA) in Gaza.

Thank you.

 

UN Watch