Is it true, as the old adage goes, that “there is honor among thieves”?  At the United Nations, yes.  Year after year, regimes that rob their citizens of freedom – like Cuba, Syria, or Sudan – dutifully band together to block exposure of their respective human rights crimes.  At the last session of the Commission on Human Rights, proposed resolutions on China’s persecution of Tibetan Buddhists, or on Zimbabwe’s bullying of political dissidents, were soundly defeated by the collective power of thuggish states, each voting to protect the other.

And is there honor, too, among the world’s free states?

In the answer to this question lies the fate of the UN.  For if democracy’s supporters cannot join together with greater strength and determination than its foes – to wit, if democratic India and South Africa persist in voting as the dictatorships do – then the world body will continue to hemorrhage the legitimacy needed to fulfill its founding vision.

Regrettably, too many democracies adhere to alliances organized around the accidents of geography, or dated ethnic, Third World or Cold War groupings.  Free nations, instead, ought to be voting their values.  What the UN needs – what the world needs – is a democracy caucus.

Fortunately, over the past few years, momentum has been gathering to achieve this very goal.  Well over 100 nations have come together – first at Warsaw in 2000 and then again at Seoul in 2002 – to build an alliance known as the Community of Democracies (CD).  Nations in the CD have committed themselves to consolidating their own democratic institutions, and to working with other countries regionally and globally to encourage democratization.  Importantly, the group has expressly mandated cooperation at the UN – a Democracy Caucus.

But can it actually work?  Skeptics rightfully question how the CD’s coalition of over 100 countries can accomplish anything.  This involves two intertwined objections.  One concerns the difficulty of managing that many members.  The second, though, goes to the very ideological raison d’etre of the group.  A big and inclusive tent looks nice, but, by embracing those whose democracy credentials are dubious at best, may ultimately stand for nothing.

The management challenge is real.  Nevertheless, the accomplishments speak for themselves.  Progress has been achieved by delegating leadership into the hands of the initial 10-member Convening Group, made up of Chile, India, Poland, the Czech Republic, the U.S.A., Mali, Mexico, Portugal, South Africa, and South Korea.  Energized by the infectious dynamism of the new democracies, this steering committee successfully oversaw the full CD’s adoption of the 2000 Warsaw Declaration, which affirmed core democratic principles and practices, and the 2003 Seoul Action Plan, which prescribed regional organization and education for democracy and good governance.

Thus, in 2003, Romania hosted a Regional Conference and NGO Forum that emphasized transparency and accountabilty in public institutions as a prerequisite for strengthening democracy.  (Ceaucescu must be rolling in his grave.)  The Convening Group is now preparing for the CD’s next major assembly in early 2005, in Santiago, Chile.  It may be a big group, but things are getting done.

Moreover, notwithstanding the CD’s big-tent approach, it affirmed its core principles before the Seoul conference by deliberately excluding numerous countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan and Malaysia.  Furious, Hosni Mubarak, Pervez Musharraf and Mahathir Mohamad all refused offers to send observers.  Yet those who did gain admission, from Albania to Uruguay, had all the more reason to feel their invitation was worth something.

At the UN, the CD’s cooperation is only in its infancy.  But its baby steps are worth noting, if only to envision how they can become strides toward a mature and cohesive alliance. <>

One year ago, the Convening Group expressly encouraged the formation of “coalitions and caucuses within the UN” to support democracy.  Specifically, it called for consultation and coordinated action at the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Commission on Human Rights.

Wasting no time, the March 2004 session of the Commission on Human Rights saw its first meeting of CD member states.  Their communiquי reaffirmed human rights and the essential elements of representative democracy.  Also, the Convening Group helped draft three resolutions promoting democracy.

These texts were not designed to provoke controversy, but at least two of them did exactly that.  For the resolution on good governance and human rights, Cuba insisted upon a separate vote to oppose the paragraph that dared to mention the Community of Democracies.  (Similarly, at the informal sessions preceding the Commission, Malaysia was incensed by the same reference.)  And on the resolution for enhancing the role of organizations in promoting democracy, eight countries abstained, including Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and China – with Cuba charging that the text ignored the world’s “various different forms of democracy.”  Interestingly, states voting on this resolution did not keep discipline as members of the Asian Group, Arab League, or Non-Aligned Movement — rather, each had to decide if it supported democracy or not.  Perhaps the old alliances are penetrable after all.

After the Commission, Convening Group representatives in Geneva have continued to meet regularly under Chile’s leadership, brainstorming on further collaborations.  And in a few weeks’ time, coinciding with the General Assembly’s 59th session, CD foreign ministers will assemble in New York to discuss future cooperation at the UN.  They ought to adopt concrete measures to entrench the Democracy Caucus, such as the assignment of an active convening Chair, with a permanent staff to coordinate consultations and common positions.

It’s high time for democracies to stick together – not “thick as thieves”, but thicker.

UN Watch