Transcript of Hearing

MCGOVERN: OK. I think we’re going to begin. So it was kind of screwy day. We’ve got votes about to happen, but I think we should begin. And then I’m going to have to leave and go to the Rules Committee. We’re doing the Department of Defense bill, and Congressman Pitts will be on his way after votes, so we’re going to be — it’s going to be a little bit influx (ph) here today.

But I just wanted to welcome everybody here to the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission hearing, Ten Years Later: The Status of the United Nations Human Rights Council. And my colleague, Congressman Pitts, this is the one who is the lead on this — on this hearing. And you will hear from him when he arrives. But I wanted to — I want to — I want to thank him and join him in welcoming all of you to today’s hearing.

I would especially like to recognize Ambassador Keith Harper, our country’s representative to the Human Rights Council. Ambassador, I know that your diplomatic skill was responsible for the excellent joint statement by the U.S. and 11 other countries on the human rights situation in China delivered to the Human Rights Council last March and for making possible the side event with Nobel laureates in which his Holiness, the Dalai Lama spoke. And I want to thank you for those initiatives.

It’s been 10 years since the United Nations General Assembly replaced the widely criticized U.N. Commission on Human Rights with a new body, the U.N. Human Rights Council. It’s been seven years since President Obama reversed an initial policy of disengagement and decided to seek a seat on the council with a goal of shaping its development for the better.

This past January, the U.S. completed two consecutive very active terms of the council, so now is a good moment to examine the impact of U.S. engagement on the council itself and in relation to our national interest and values. As we undertake this review, it is useful, first, to recall the breadth of the council’s mandate. It’s supposed to promote universal respect for all human rights through education, advisory services, technical assistance and capacity building, address situations of violations of human rights including gross and systematic violations, serve as a forum for dialogue on thematic rights issues, make recommendations to further develop human rights law, and contribute to the prevention of human rights violations among other responsibilities. The brief is huge and, of course, global.

Second, a serious examination of the state of the council has to take into account the full range of activities of all of its mechanisms — the Universal Periodic Review, or UPR; the Advisory Committee; the complaint procedures and the special procedures, both thematic and country-specific including country visits and reports and commissions of inquiry. Quantitative analysis has its place, but it’s not sufficient. I’m interested in the qualitative impact of the Council’s work.

Third, we should remember that only about 3.5% of the regular U.N. budget is allocated to all human rights activities, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in mere $198 million out of the $5.6 billion budget — budget proposed for the 2016-2017 biennium.

Of this amount, only about $44 million over two years is destined for the Human Rights Council. This regular budget allocation is nowhere near enough to implement existing human rights mandates. It would fund less than half so the U.N. rights system has to rely on additional voluntary contributions that may or may not materialize.

Human rights is supposed to be the third pillar of the U.N. system alongside economic and social development, and peace and security. Looking at the numbers, that is simply not the case. As an aside, voluntary contributions are like — are like those our government provides to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia. Not only do I believe these contributions should be increased, but I am angry and frustrated that the U.S. is failing to provide the Office with sufficient funding right now, this year, forcing cuts and staff at a moment when the Office is already very necessary and may soon see a significant increase in responsibilities if a peace accord is signed and begins to be implemented.

This is the classic case of nickel and diming human rights work. And I hope the Administration will provide more funding immediately to Colombia’s U.N. Human Rights Office.

As co-chair of this Commission, I am constantly hearing about terrible human rights problems all over the world. Human rights violations are more likely to occur under authoritarian rule or in situations of armed conflict, but they can occur anywhere including in our own country.

Certainly, our allies are not immune. Consider the reports that regularly come out of Bahrain and — or Saudi Arabia.

Since the Council was established, engagement in participation especially by the UPR process has exceeded expectations. Given the reality of today’s world and the fact that international human rights standards set the terms of the debate, we can only expect the demands of the U.N. human rights system to continue to increase.

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the achievements of the Human Rights Council, its limitations, the impact of U.S. engagement and their recommendations as to how we and the United States Congress can contribute to continuing to strengthen the Council in the future.

In light of the growing crackdown of civil society and human rights organizations around the world, I am especially interested in recommendations for guaranteeing and strengthening civil society participation and for protecting the — and for protecting the human rights defenders who do participate. So I thank you for your patience in letting me give an opening statement.

And let me…

(UNKNOWN): Recess until Mr. Pitts gets here.

MCGOVERN: OK. And I think we’re — I’m just been told that we’re going to…

(UNKNOWN): Recess for votes.

MCGOVERN: Oh, we’re going to recess for votes. I apologize. I was going to go ahead, but we’re going to wait until Mr. Pitts gets here. But I thank you all for being here, and this is an important topic. And I want to say that I do value the work of the — of the Council, and I want to make sure that you have the resources and the wind at your back to be able to — to do the work that we all expect.

So, with that, we will briefly recess. Thank you.

(RECESS)

(UNKNOWN): Everyone, again thank you for coming. I apologize, but votes have been delayed further, and so it’s going to be a little bit later. We’re expecting to reconvene about 2:45, in about 30 minutes. Again, we apologize for the delay.

PITTS: I apologize for the delay. We’re voting on the floor, so thank you for your patience.

Ladies and gentlemen, witnesses, distinguished guests, I call this hearing to order. The hearing is entitled “Ten Years Later: The Status of the United Nations Human Rights Council.”

It will be comprised of two panels. I’ll recognize myself for an opening statement.

Seventy years ago, in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the terrors of fascism and national socialism, much of the international community recognize the desperate need for a renewed commitment to protecting the fundamental human rights of every individual.

In 1946, the Human Rights Commission was created for this very purpose, and this Commission was to reflect the global effort to establish human rights norms across the globe and encourage their protection in every nation. Yet, over the course of the next 60 years, the Commission lost much, if not all, of its credibility, its members frequently included nations where themselves responsible for allowing perpetrating egregious human rights violations, the Commission condemned issues selectively often avoiding obvious abuses thanks to the work of members more interested in protecting their own falling records and addressing real issues.

At the same time, the Commission maintained a persistent bias against Israel leveling an ordinate amount of time and resources at a single state while other concerns were left unaddressed. And that’s why, in 2006, the Commission was retired and replaced by the new slightly smaller U.N. Human Rights Council.

In its founding resolution, this new 47-member body was tasked by the General Assembly with, quote, “addressing situations of violations of human rights violations of human rights including gross and systematic violations. And the Council will be guided by the principles of universality and partiality objectivity, and non-selectivity,” end quote. And this (inaudible) in the General Assembly stipulated that, “Nations elected to the Council shall uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection human rights shall fully cooperate with the Council,” end quote.

Ten years later, many questions remain as to how effectively the Council has achieved these ideals and overcome the legacy of its predecessor. At the same time, there can be no question of the need for stronger international action to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights.

According to Freedom House’s most Freedom in the World report, less than half of the world’s population enjoys sufficient political rights and civil liberties to be considered free. Over the last decade, 105 countries have seen a net decline in their scores on this report, but only 61 have experienced a net improvement.

In March, U.S. House representatives, the State Department acknowledged and condemned the genocide currently being perpetrated against religious minorities in the Middle East by the so-called Islamic State. While this is an important and commendable step, it only begins to address the enormous threats to freedom of religion and belief the world faces today.

In its most recent report on the latest trends and religious restrictions and hostilities, the Pew Research Center concluded that 77 percent of the world’s population is living in countries with high or very high levels of restrictions on religion. We must also not forget the millions of men, women, and children who continue to be trafficked as modern day slaves, both domestically and across international borders.

According to the U.S. State Department’s most recent trafficking in person’s report, 156 countries have yet to fully comply with the minimum standards of the victims of Trafficking and Violent Protection Act in 2000, which include, among other things, that, quote, “The government of the country should make serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons,” end quote.

Given these and many other monumental human rights challenges in existence today, it is only fitting that we examine the status of what is arguably the world’s highest profile mechanism for confronting these challenges.

As the now 10-year-old Council improved upon the lackluster reputation of its predecessor and is it effectively and impartially addressing the gross and systematic violations of human rights that we see today, these are not merely questions for intellectual debate. The actions of the Council, or lack thereof, can either promote or hinder the growth of many different freedoms worldwide and have the potential to impact countless lives.

What’s more, United States currently provides more than one-fifth of the U.N.’s funding with contributions allowed to be made available to the council when the Secretary of State considers our participation of the international interest. Those funds appropriated by Congress must only be used to support a council whose work can truly be considered, quote, “balanced, credible, and effective,” end quote.

One of, if not the greatest impediments, to a credible council remains its insistence on keeping Israel as a permanent standalone item on the Council’s agenda. While every country deserves scrutiny, no other single country in the world has ever been subjected to this level of attention by the Council or made a standing agenda item for the Council. And I would like to use this opportunity to publicly call for the removal of Israel from the Council’s standing agenda.

With that, I look forward to hearing the testimony of our many distinguished witnesses here today as we explore the status of the Council, areas for potential improvement, and our best options for encouraging reform.

I’ll introduce — introduce the first panel in the order of their presentations.

First, Erin Barclay is a career member of the Senior Executive Service and currently serves as deputy assistant secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs. Prior to assuming this position, she was the acting assistant secretary in the Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

Prior to joining the Department, she was executive director of the Network of East-West Women, a nonprofit that promotes women’s human rights in the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Ms. Barclay has been an adjunct professor of International Women’s Human Rights at Georgetown University Law Center and George Mason University.

Secondly, we have Ambassador Keith Harper. He’s nominated by President Obama to serve as the representative of the United States to U.N. Human Rights Council, and he was confirmed by the Senate on June 4, 2014. Previously, Mr. Harper was a partner at the law firm of Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, LLP, where he was chair of the Native American Practice Group. Mr. Harper also served as senior staff attorney for the Native American Rights Fund from 1995 to 2006. And from 2007 to 2008, he served as a Supreme Court justice on the Supreme Court of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians.

He’s a member of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, currently serves as a member on the President’s Commission on White House fellowships from 1998 to 2001. He was an adjunct professor at the Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law from 1999 to 2001. He was professorial lecturer at the American University Washington College of Law.

Finally, Mr. Scott Busby serves as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. where he oversees the Bureau’s work in the East Asia and the Pacific as well as on multilateral global issues including U.S. engagement on human rights at the U.N., Internet freedom and business and human rights. Previously, he served as director for Human Rights on the National Security Council in the White House from 2009 to 2011 where he managed a wide range of human rights and refugee issues.

From 2005 to 2009, he was coordinator of the intergovernmental consultation on migration asylum and refugees in Geneva, Switzerland. So with those introductions, let me again say thank you for your patience. Thank you for sharing your expertise with us today. And we’ll go in five-minute tranches.

So, Ms. Barclay, you’re recognized for five minutes for your testimony.

BARCLAY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s truly an honor to appear before this commission named for a great champion of human rights and advocate for U.S. leadership on these fundamentally important issues.

As you said, this year marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the U.N. Human Rights Council, set-up to replace its widely discredited predecessor, the U.N. Commission for Human Rights.

As you know, the United States did not join the HRC until 2009 when this Administration determined that our active engagement would advance U.S. interest by providing much needed leadership to focus the Council on the most pressing and serious human rights challenges. A review of the HRC’s performance prior to our membership and since 2009 shows that there is no comparison. We made the right decision.

In its first three years, the Council failed to carry out its responsibility to promote universal respect for the protection of human rights, establishing no new country-specific special procedure mandates, eliminating mandates for Cuba and Belarus, and targeting Israel with five separate special sessions.

Just prior to our joining the Council, the HRC, in May 2009, adopted a resolution effectively congratulating the Sri Lankan government for actions that resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. The Council oversaw a weakening of its defensive freedom of expression, allowing deeply troubling measures against defamation of religion to prosper and largely ignoring ongoing challenges to civil society throughout the world.

Working in concert with our likeminded members as a member of the Human Rights Council, from 2009 to 2015, the U.S. pushed the HRC to condemn violations and establish effective mechanisms as never before.

A few examples. First, we focus the Council on human rights violations by North Korea, including support for the Special Rapporteur and the establishment of a landmark Commission of Inquiry whose report drew — drew worldwide attention to the DPRK’s violations including those that had said “may amount to crimes against humanity” and prompted the U.N. Security Council to take up human rights in North Korea as a permanent agenda item.

Number two, we highlight — highlighting Iranian human rights violations including those involving political and religious repression and the establishment of a Special Rapporteur on Iran.

Three, establishing and sustaining U.N. monitoring mechanisms of violations and abuses in Syria, particularly through the efforts of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria to help build the case for future accountability.

Number four, in 2010, creating the first new Special Rapporteur focused on fundamental freedoms — I hope that’s not me. It’s not.

The first — in 2010, the first new Special Rapporteur focused on fundamental freedoms in 17 years, the Special Rapporteur on the rise to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of associations mandate was renewed in 2013.

Next, promoting through a trustee resolutions and special procedures mechanisms the rights to freedom of expression and association, including on the Internet, the elimination of discrimination against women and girls, and the human rights of LGBTI persons.

Number six, gaining the support of 78 U.N. member states to join us in an HRC statement countering violation extremism while promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Next, we secure the HRC’s first resolution urging states to protect a child’s and a woman’s right to nationality. We’ve also established a U.N. mechanism — the U.N. investigation into violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes committed in Sri Lanka during its civil war.

And finally, we’ve addressed the human rights situation in Burma including anti-Muslim violence in the plight of the Rohingya population, ensuring the continuation of a Special Rapporteur on Burma.

Through all of this we’ve strengthened the participation of civil society organizations in the Council’s work and focus more attention on the shrinking space for civil society and the threats faced by journalists, human rights defenders, and other activists. These issues were previously underrepresented or ignored all together in the Council. Today, they’re at the core of the U.N. Human Rights Council’s agenda.

The HRC’s actions shine a light on the — the (inaudible) violations of human rights and help create space for civil society to hold their governments to account. Civil society groups in Iran and Sri Lanka have recounted how valuable the Council’s resolutions have been to their advocacy efforts.

The HRC’s work on technical assistance and cooperation on human rights has also spurred positive changes with many countries seeking assistance and welcoming OHCHR offices in their countries to train police on human rights, improve elections, strengthen the judiciary, and help build civil society, to name just a few.

Of course, the Council remains an imperfect body. The HRC’s current membership includes many states with poor human rights records. Many member states are opposed to country-specific resolutions in nearly all cases and keen to divert attention away from the real human rights challenges.

The abuse of procedure, for example, hostile amendments, no action motions, objections to NGO participation and introduction of competing resolutions is on the rise. The tendency toward block voting is still strong.

And finally, the Council maintains an agenda item as you said, Mr. Chairman, an agenda item devoted exclusively to the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories, which stands as a clear indication of a strong bias against Israel.

When we are on the Council, our presence however ensures that there is at least one member to call a vote and vote against the anti-Israel resolutions so that at least they do not pass by consensus. Prior to our joining the HRC, over one-half of all country-specific resolutions the Council adopted concerned Israel. Thanks to our leadership and greatly expanding the number of resolutions on situations in places like Syria, North Korea and Iran, and our efforts to minimize the time and attention devoted to the anti-Israel measures, today about one-fifth of the Human Rights Council’s country resolutions deal with the Palestinian territories.

That’s still far too many, but there is no doubt that the re-orientation of the HRC to deal with the world’s worst violators would not have been possible without the U.S. in the chamber as a member indeed, with us off the Council this year, taking a mandatory year off while seeking reelection in the fall. The annual anti-Israel Item 7 resolutions were called to a vote at last month’s session, but without any country voting no.

In this year, off the U.N. Human Rights Council, the U.S. is as engaged as ever in supporting the Council as it acts in furtherance of its mandate, promoting universal respect for the protection of human rights worldwide. We intend to continue working closely with our friends and adversaries alike to help shape its agenda, fight bias against Israel, and advocate for a membership committed to taking on human rights challenges with courage and principled conviction.

More can and must be done to expose and promote accountability for human rights violators and promote the values that we, as Americans, hold dear. Thanks to our active engagement and leadership, the U.N. Human Rights Council is rather much closer to meeting its purpose and potential and considerably more effective than it used to be. Our national interest is served when multilateral institutions like the HRC work according to their missions affecting change however incremental at times. In situations that require a collective action or in which our efforts alone will be easily dismissed as politically motivated.

Without the U.S. and fellow democratic states on the Council, the HRC would quickly become irrelevant or much worse. With us there we will continue to have a powerful voice in determining its course and helping it live to its mission as the world’s foremost human rights body.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentlelady.

Mr. Ambassador, you’re recognized for five minutes for your opening statement.

HARPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased and honored to testify before the Commission today. This Commission is a manifestation of the United States core commitment to universal human rights. Likewise, the United States engagement of the Human Rights Council represents our firm belief that human rights is and should be a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions. Greater respect in adherence to human rights norms is the effective basis for a safer, more secure and more prosperous world.

In 2006, the inception of the Human Rights Council, a decision was made that the United States would neither seek nor seriously engage at the Council. Among the principal reasons for these decisions — not to engage — was the structural bias against the state of Israel, fear that the Council would not focus attention on the major human rights violating states, and the — and that the Council would include some of the worst human rights violators as its members.

The policy of non-engagement with the Council lasted about four years. As Deputy Assistant Secretary Barclay just noted, in 2009, President Obama changed that posture based on the idea that if we wanted the principal international body to be an effective — would be effective in promoting and protecting human rights, the United States would have to fully engage at the Human Rights Council.

We are at an important moment. We have four years when the United States did not seek and was not engaged at the Council in six years when we have been engaged. The history offers us now a rare opportunity to assess the important question — comparing and contrasting when the U.S. was and was not engaged at the Human Rights Council and ask which led to better results.

And the results could not be more clear — U.S. engagement and leadership matters. By virtually any measure, the Council has been able to discharge its duty to promote and protect human rights far better with an active United States working with our partners.

What the last six years have shown is that when we engage the Council the can be an instrument to point a spotlight on the worse human rights violating countries — countries like Syria and South Sudan; Iran and Ukraine, and the Russian-occupied of Ukraine; Sudan and Burma; Burundi and North Korea. This is not to say that the Council is an institution without serious flaws. The fact is — and let me be unmistakably clear on this point, the Council has demonstrated a bias against the state of Israel. We work constantly to chip away at that bias, but the bias is structural in nature.

Under the — as — Mr. Chairman, you noted the Item 7 of the Council’s standing agenda.

Secretary Kerry said, when speaking to the Council last year and reiterated by Deputy Secretary Blinken this year, “The continuing bias on Israel undermines the very credibility of the Council.” But in my mind that there is a bias does not answer the question of whether the United States should engage at the Council. The question can be more — can we be more effective in addressing the bias with or without U.S. engagement.

In 2006 — and on this I’d like to go over some of the — some of the data in — to compare and contrast.

In 2006, the first year of the Council, when the U.S. did not seriously engaged, the Council passed seven resolutions on country-specific situations. There were other decisions of the Council but seven resolutions. All seven resolutions were on Israel. Seven resolutions, seven condemning Israel. No resolution condemning Sudan or North Korea or Iran or any of the other countries with horrible human rights records and ongoing serious situations.

Let us compare what happened last year. In 2015, the Human Rights Council passed a total of 31 resolutions addressing individual country situations in the standing agenda items 10, 2, 4 and then, of course, 7. These included three on Syria, two on Burundi, and two or Burma as well as resolutions on North Korea, Iran, South Sudan, Sudan, Eretria, Libya, Ukraine, Central African Republic, and countries addressing the scourge of Boko Haram, and numerous other countries.

Still as Deputy Assistant Secretary Barclay noted, too much of a focus, but one can see the marked change in the attention that is brought through U.S. active engagement.

Let me note one other item, special sessions. These special sessions are where the Council sees a situation that is so grave and so serious. It should not wait for the next Council session, and so it calls special session by getting 16 country members of the Council to sign a letter asking for such a session. These are when — these are considered the most serious situations around.

In the four years — in the first four years of the Council, there were six special sessions on Israel, six out of a total of 12 special sessions. In the last six years with U.S. fully engaged with our ambassadors in place, there’s been one special session on Israel in that six-year period, six in — in four years, one in the following six years.

Let me give you — let me — let me put a little bit finer point on it. In 2006, there were three special sessions on Israel and one on Darfur. In 2011, there were four special sessions total, one on Libya, three on the human rights disaster in Syria, none on the state of Israel. And so it is not that there is not the bias, but the — but the fact is when we engage at the Council, when we work with our partners, we can take the Council apparatus and point it at the human rights situations that deserve the most attention. And we’ve seen this in the fundamental shift with respect to special sessions.

Let me just also highlight some of the issues that Deputy Assistant Secretary Erin Barclay was — was talking about. I’m going to — I want to talk about three examples in particular, first, on North Korea.

In North Korea, the Council established a Commission of Inquiry that did an incredibly well done and documented report, oftentimes referred to as the Kirby Commission report. This report detailed evidence-based report with specific — based on specific testimony of various victims’ witnesses has fundamentally changed this conversation about human rights in North Korea. There were states before this report that defended North Koreans and said, “Hey, these — these are accusations and the situation is as basically as — as some countries are saying.

They don’t make that argument anymore. They don’t — they say we should have a different tack at how — how to address the situation in North Korea, but they do not challenge the facts because we have a strong report coming out of the United Nations. So this has fundamentally changed this conversation on North Korea.

Another good example is Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the — led by the United States working with some key partners, there was a resolution passed that created an investigatory commission on the end of the LTTE conflict in 2010 and also some of the other human rights abuses and violations in Sri Lanka.

At the time, President Rajapaksa took a very stubborn negative hostile position to the Human Rights Council, refused to have any accountability mechanism for the end of the LTTE conflict. This investigation led to a dramatic shift in the politics in Sri Lanka and ultimately, among other things, led to a change in — through the January 8th election of President Sirisena. That — that shift led to a completely different posture, a different attitude from Sri Lanka regarding the necessity for an accountability mechanism as the basis of ultimate reconciliation. And so he see in this instance a — a direct link between actions taken at the Council and changes on the ground in a profound and measurable way in — in the country.

Now, I want to be clear, Sri Lanka has a long road ahead and it’s just at the beginning of a process to — to put in place a serious accountability mechanism, but we should not forget the shift that has occurred in the value of that shift.

Most recently, the United States led the call for a special session on Burundi. As you know, since President Nkurunziza decided not to — to run for a — for a third term, it’s led to significant instability, numerous human rights violations, torture, extrajudicial killings, reports of mass graves. We call for a special session in the — in the December timeframe of 2015 and pass a very strong resolution that created an investigatory mechanism under the High Commissioners’ auspices.

This combined with actions at the United Nations Security Council and action taken by the African Union has led to somewhat of a — a different place that — that Burundi is at. There are not so much — there isn’t the same level of fear of going into a mass atrocity situation.

This is not to say that we shouldn’t still pay attention to Burundi. I mean, it’s still an ongoing situation. But this kind of action can bring the world’s attention to these important — to these important situations.

Finally, as noted by the — by the cochairman, we just along with 12 countries ran a joint statement on the deterring human rights situation in China. As you know, with the arrest of human rights defenders, the lawyers, and then the kidnappings of individuals from both Hong Kong and Thailand, we felt the need to draw a line in the sand, and we did so through a joint statement.

There’s numerous other actions that the Council take. There’s the universal periodic review that has led to numerous changes in country after country around the world. As my colleague mentioned, there are thematic resolutions on things that are at the core of American values like freedom of association and assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of religion and belief, women’s rights, discrimination and violence of LGBTI persons. These are important in setting the agenda for the expectations of countries regarding these core human rights issues.

Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is the Human Rights Council is far from a perfect institution. It does have serious flaws, including a hyper focus on Israel. But despite these flaws, the United States leadership can be an instrument — with United States leadership, the Council can be an instrument to promote and protect human rights around the world.

Thank you.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes Secretary Busby for five minutes for his opening statement.

BUSBY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the Committee for — Commission for bringing us together today.

My colleagues, Ambassador Keith Harper and Deputy Assistant Secretary Erin Barclay, have given you a good outline of U.S. accomplishments at the Council. Let me use a few examples to describe in more detail how these accomplishments have helped to advance human rights on the ground.

I’d like to start by noting how often our actions and United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions are raised with our bureau by civil society activists and human rights defenders around the world. They noticed these actions and are fortified by the international recognition the Council provides.

It may seem strange to us, but for people who live in repressive conditions with a government actively censors or arrest individuals for telling the truth, the simple act of acknowledgement of their situation by the international community knowing that someone here is them is a far greater gift than we can understand.

Second, as Erin and Keith have highlighted, there are some situations where action — actions by the Human Rights Council has been crucial to producing positive change including in places like Cote D’Ivoire, Sri Lanka, and Burundi. Keith has described the impact in — impacts in Sri Lanka and Burundi. Let me talk about a slightly older situation in Cote D’Ivoire.

In Cote D’Ivoire, in December 2010, President Laurent Gbagbo refused to leave office after a 10-year rule in his electoral loss to Alassane Ouattara. Gbagbo instead launched a campaign of brutal repression against Ouattara and his supporters. Deeply concerned about the standoff and escalating violence, we led the initiative to convene an emergency special session focused on the abuses in Cote D’Ivoire.

The HRC issued a strong resolution recognizing Ouattara as president and calling for an end to the violence. It also led to ongoing reporting on Cote D’Ivoire, including the appointment of a high-level independent Commission of Inquiry. The Commission’s reporting supported the ICC’s indictment of Gbagbo who ended up surrendering to the court.

Today the human rights situation in Cote D’Ivoire is markedly improved. In October 2015, Cote D’Ivoire held peaceful and credible elections. The U.N. Security Council recently lifted sanctions and we believe the work the United States did in the Human Rights Council contributed to this result.

On Sri Lanka, let me just reiterate what Ambassador Harper just said. We undertook special efforts to change the course in the Human Rights Council on Sri Lanka, helping to pass three resolutions over several years. We believe that the passage of those resolutions led to the de-legitimatization of the former Sri Lankan government and contributed to that government being voted out of office last year.

On Burundi as well, as Ambassador Harper emphasized, the U.S. responded quickly to the warning signals of mass atrocity by leading the call for convening of a special session over the Council in December. We cosponsored the resolution adopted by the Council and — which condemned violations and abuses of human rights and requested the High Commissioner to urgently deploy a team of independent experts to Burundi to investigate these allegations.

That team provided an oral report on its first visit to Burundi and will provide another update in June. We believe that this work with our allies in the Human Rights Council and in other multilateral fora has helped spur the needed international attention to help avert disaster.

In addition to addressing situations and specific countries, our engagement in the Council has also helped to elevate attention to important cross-cutting thematic issues. For instance, early on in our engagement with the Council, we recognize that there was a significant gap in the Council’s coverage of fundamental freedoms. No one was charged for — with monitoring the right to peaceful assembly and association.

The U.S. forged a cross-regional group to establish a new Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and association. That Special Rapporteur has enhanced the international attention to restrictive NGO laws and attacks on human rights defenders including those working to advance the rights of LGBTI persons. His reports have attracted a significant amount of attention and reaction especially among repressive governments, and we think that suggests that he is having an impact.

Another issue on which U.S. engagement produced a sea change in international thinking and action was the so-called defamation of religion resolution. In place since 1999, the U.N.’s defamation resolution was a product of the organization for Islamic cooperation though it had roots and frustration over treatment of Muslims, particularly in Europe, the resolution misapplied human rights to religions rather than to individuals. The language of the resolution was also used by some countries to justify things like blasphemy and defamation laws, which are often used to imprison political opposition voices, academics, and religious minorities.

Drawing inspiration from our own national experience fighting discrimination on the basis of religion and race, we work closely with Pakistan and the U.K., and created a compromised text focused on protecting individual rights and what states can do to foster pluralism and combat discrimination. The resolution embodying that compromise also calls for practical and effective measures to combat religious intolerance and discrimination rather than focusing on banning speech.

Subsequent to adoption of that resolution, we have been involved and launched really something called the Istanbul process where experts identify best practices to combat discrimination and intolerance in affirming the sincerity of our commitment to tackle the very real problem of intolerance with actions as well as words. And I should note that in that regard, we have experts from our own departments of Justice and Homeland Security who participate in workshops with other countries to talk about what we do to combat religious and ethnic discrimination.

Today we have successfully held trainings on these issues in Bosnia, Indonesia, Greece and Spain, and we are looking into doing training workshops and other countries this year.

Finally, the HRC offers us a venue where we can work with likeminded countries to address human rights challenges across the globe. As Ambassador Harper has noted in the March session, we were pleased to lead the first ever joint statement before the Council on the human rights situation in China calling attention to its increasingly troubling behavior. And I would note that we received thanks from hundreds of individuals in China, both activists themselves and their family members who felt that the statement reinforced them, recognizes — recognize them and the plight they are currently suffering.

We are also able to raise concerns and make recommendations about human rights issues in particular countries through the universal periodic process in which every five years every U.N. member state comes before the HRC to present its own record on human rights and to take questions and recommendations from other member states. This process has elevated human rights issues within governments, the U.N., and the media, and has created further space for civil society to engage in the process. The recommendations have motivated governments to make real progress on their human rights records. We have seen 100 participation by member states in this process with many following up on recommendations, which have a lasting impact domestically.

In sum, we believe, as Ambassador Harper and Deputy Assistant Secretary Erin Barclay have said that U.S. engagement in the HRC has helped advanced the ball on human rights in a variety of places in a variety of ways. I thank you for the — your interest in our work and welcome your questions.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman.

Before we have any questioning, the Chair notes the presence of the member from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline. Would — do you desire an opening statement?

CICILLINE: Just briefly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this timely and important hearing.

The United Nations Human Rights Council is of tremendous important to the United States and our global interest especially at a time of instability and crisis in many parts of the world. The United States leadership at the Council’s 31st session earlier this year was critical to shaping the international community’s responses to many of today’s global challenges, including the situation in South Sudan, the renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur in Iran, protecting human rights defenders, combating religious intolerance, and opposing the standalone agenda item on Israel to help prevent the Council’s bias against Israel.

And while the Council certainly remains flawed, I think that having strong U.S. participation has been vitally important and ensuring close examination of important human rights issues and blocking efforts to use the Council as a vehicle for criticizing Israel.

I thank the witnesses for their testimony and look forward to having the opportunity to ask some questions. And I thank you and yield back.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman.

I’ll begin the questioning. I’ll recognize myself for five minutes for that purpose.

Ambassador Harper, we move again with you as we noted in the beginning and some of you noted in your testimony there seems to be a blatant anti-Israel bias with the — that undermines the Council’s credibility. Are there any indications that Israel will be removed from the standing agenda soon? Are there any efforts currently underway to resolve the issue? Can we expect the United States or an ally to initiate a motion to this effect in the next session of the Council this fall?

HARPER: Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.

The agenda item is called Agenda Item 7, which is the standing item on the state of Israel, is in the founding resolution that was first (inaudible) the Council and then accepted at the General Assembly. That will be reviewed. I think my — the next time is in 2021 at — it gets reviewed at these — at these five to 10-year intervals. And that will be the next opportunity to review Agenda Item 7 and its continuing viability.

We agree with you wholeheartedly that this item should not exist. We — we take a principled position that we call a vote and vote against any resolution under Item 7 regardless of content because it is a — it is a manifestation of this anti-Israel bias. And so we will continue to take that posture, right.

I would — I would note though as — as I mentioned a bit earlier that one — our plan in the interim is to make sure that we are working with our colleagues to try to chip away at this bias. And we have seen a marked change because of our engagement in, for example, special sessions with our engagement far fewer than without our engagement. And so that’s going to be our continuing posture. We will look forward to working with partners to try to remove the — the item at the first possible juncture than we’re able to.

PITTS: Thank you. Now, in March, Mr. Ambassador, do you — United States acknowledged and condemn the genocide of religious minorities in Middle East at the hands of the Islamic State. To your knowledge, have any members of the Council proposed a resolution acknowledging this genocide? Number one.

Is the United States, if reelected to the Council, committed to introduce the resolution condemning the genocide of religious minorities in the Middle East referring to the situation perhaps the U.N. Security Council?

HARPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Not to my knowledge as there have been any conversation at this point about that. I — I will note that in 2014 — in September of 2014, there was a special session of the Human Rights Council on Islamic State on Daesh, and it led to a resolution with a calling for an investigation into the human rights abuses of Daesh.

As far as the — the genocidal acts, I think that that is certainly something that we will take back to the — to the department and consider upon our — when we’re once again members of the Council. At this point, I have — I have not heard of that particular inclusion in any Council resolution.

PITTS: Thank you.

Secretary Barclay, some observers of the Human Rights Council have noted a lack of significant engagement by other major democracies or states with positive human rights records. In your opinion, why are many states reticent to run for membership in the Council? Do you expect other major democracies to increase their participation in the Council? Given the past efforts by the U.S. on this front, are there any new incentives for these states to increase their engagement?

BARCLAY: Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. The question of membership is one that we spend quite a bit of time on in our team working through, and we will continue to encourage and support members — U.S. member states with strong human rights records to run for the Council. I think U.S. participation in the Council is a real incentive for other countries with good human rights records to get onboard and work with us there.

But as we all — I said and my colleagues have also said during their testimony, it is a U.N. — it is a U.N. body, and so there are 193 member states who are able to run — run.

I think one of the issues — one of the challenges we have with many states, with positive human rights records is that they have a very small diplomatic presence in Geneva and in — globally, and so it’s a — it’s a heavy lift from a resource perspective for them to do that. But we will continue our outreach as we have done to countries with good human rights records to try to get them to join us on the Council, Sir.

PITTS: OK. And — and how, if at all, is the ability of the U.S. to promote its human rights agenda within the Council framework affected by its observer status? And — and, you know, if you would describe at least the U.S. relationship with other Council members?

BARCLAY: I can start, but I’d ask Ambassador Harper to — to chime in since he’s on the ground really working these relationships.

I would say in our year off, our mandatory furlough year off the Council, our workload hasn’t ceased at all. We’ve been just as engaged as we’ve been in the prior years, both here and Washington and the team out in the field.

And — and so I’d ask maybe Ambassador Harper if you want to talk a little bit about working with other member states during the year off and whether that has changed at all.

HARPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a — we — we are in our one year off. It does make some aspects more challenging because we — we don’t have the same level of opportunity to deliver statements or lead during the voting process.

Having said that, we have a lot of partners that we work with who are members of the Council. And we work closely with them in calling votes on resolutions that are problematic and supporting initiative that — that we — that we support. And, frankly, it hasn’t really changed in any fundamental way the results.

In the most recent session, for example, we had a consensus resolution on North Korea. We had a consensus resolution on Myanmar. And so the actions of the Council are still pointing to some of the worst human rights violators.

In Iran, there was a resolution that was adopted by the same number of yes votes as the prior year. So, it is a — it is a challenge. It just means we have to work a little harder to get the same results, but we’re prepared to do that. And we’re prepared to, in addition, take actions like we do with China with broad support from — from partners in pointing to some of the troubling human rights developments there.

PITTS: Thank you.

Secretary Busby, in many particularly severe cases of human rights violations, the Council has taken little or no action, you know, in — in China, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Russia are examples of states that have largely escaped censure from the Council despite serious violations in the past decade. In fact, U.N. Watch said this, quote, “A hundred and seventy-nine of the 193 U.N. member states have never been condemned by the Council for any human rights violations,” end quote.

How do you explain the absence of action on such a wide array of human right — rights violation? Does — does membership in the Council help to insulate states that commit human rights violations from negative resolutions or actions by the Council?

BUSBY: It’s a very good question, Mr. Chairman. First, I would highlight once again this joint statement that we led on China at the last Human Rights Council session. It wasn’t formal action by the Council, but it did kind of — it was a short across the bow and has been widely recognized by members of the Council and others as a first attempt to speak out in a coordinated joint fashion on the situation in China.

On some of these other countries like Russia and Saudi Arabia, you know, our judgment is that action simply won’t be successful that these countries wield too much power and influence with other smaller, less powerful countries, and so that taking formal action simply wouldn’t succeed and might — set back efforts might be disheartening.

That said, we do have opportunities to speak out on the situations in these countries, and we do regularly speak out on each of the — these countries in what is called our Item 4 Statement, which is a statement to address the worst of the worst violators. And we will continue to do that and urge other likeminded countries to do the same.

PITTS: Now, currently the U.S. State Department issues of fact sheet listing U.S. achievements at the Council at the conclusion of each regular Council session. And the fact sheet does not, however, list any outstanding issues left unaddressed by the Council or resolutions that were passed despite opposition from the U.S. What’s the chance of the State Department producing a more comprehensive report or assessment of U.S. involvement at the Council? And including a list of major violations the Council should still address?

BUSBY: Very briefly and I’ll invite my colleagues to — to address as well. I think it would be a long list, Mr. Chairman. I think it’d be challenging to list all of the situations or abuses. We’d like the Council to rest. We’ve tried to limit our focus to those things that we think we can make a difference on in the Council, so I think I personally and I think our bureau would be reluctant to — to produce such a list.

PITTS: Mr. Ambassador?

HARPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Look, I think Scott is entirely correct. That would be quite a long list. The fact is that there are many situations that we would like to address that don’t get addressed at the Council. And the — we — we do evaluate whether or not the various instruments that — that we can utilize at the Council through joint statements, through our Item — various agenda item statements during other debates at the Council whether we can then pursue things that are important to us in human rights situations around the globe.

And we’re looking for every opportunity to effectively get our views out there. And these things do have an impact. You know, we haven’t run a resolution on Bahrain, but we’ve joined numerous joint statements on Bahrain as an example, we haven’t — as mentioned, the joint statement on China. So we will — we look for the best opportunities to fully utilize the various arrows within the quiver to — to make sure that we’re pursuing the most proactive human rights agenda possible.

I would say one thing because you mentioned the question on whether or not the membership insulates Council members. This last year 2015, Burundi was elected to the Council in — in the fall. We subsequently — two months later, in December, ran along with our partners had a joint — a special session on Burundi with a very condemnatory resolution that came out of that. So the answer to that is at least, in some cases, it does not insulate and that’s a good example of where despite membership or despite getting elected to the Council we were able to pass a very

strong resolution in a situation that we needed to do so.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman. My time has expired. The Chair recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline.

CICILLINE: Thank you — thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Harper, in your testimony, you noted the problematic issues related to membership on the Council and the number of nations with very, very bad and deeply disturbing human rights records including China, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Russia and even Vietnam have recently been or are current members of the Council. And the — their election to the Council appear to not have been publicly opposed by United States State Department. So my question is why does the State Department not publicly oppose membership of major human rights violators to the Human Rights Council?

And in addition to that, what can we do — what can the United States do realistically to respond to this because, obviously, it undermines the work of the Council and the integrity of the conclusions of the Council and the actions that they take?

HARPER: Thank you, Congressman, for the — for the question.

Look, I — first, as a blanket rule, we do not discuss publicly how we vote or who we support for any votes within the U.N. system that the…

CICILLINE: But that’s a slightly different question. I get the idea of not expressing that ultimate vote, but I guess, I’m asking a little more nuance. Wouldn’t it be appropriate for us to say even without adhering to that policy that there — that this particular country representative is not appropriate on the Council because of a long record of human rights violations and making those general objections both to raise public awareness of that and also to support the credibility of the work that the Council does. I mean, I’m just wondering why that isn’t considered.

HARPER: Yeah. You know, as a matter of policy, my understanding is that we don’t make those kinds of public statements on — on these and, you know, we can certainly take that back to see if we can get a little bit more, as I say, nuance on — on how we publicly message it. We do work to encourage states with better human rights records to run for — for Council membership. And we will continue to do that.

I would note though that, you know, this — this criticism regarding the membership of the Council, I — I get it. I understand it, but we should not also lose sight of the fact that despite the fact that China, and Russia, and Cuba, and Venezuela are members of the Council that we pass a resolution by consensus on things that are core values like freedom of expression and freedom of religious — religion and belief, and freedom of association and assembly, and so — and things like — and things like civil society spaces. So these are our values that are more — far more often than not the things that are produced from the Council despite the fact that we have these human rights abusers who are also members of the Council.

It is something that we are continually concerned about. It’s one of the reasons we spend a lot of energy trying to encourage states to run for the Council because we — we agree with you that we would like to see a Council with members that share our values to a greater degree as well to the fullest extent possible

But I also do want to note as my colleague, Erin Barclay, has — has mentioned, this is a body of member states in the — contained autocratic states. They contain dictators. They contain democracies. They contain the whole wide panoply that the world has, and those are the states that vote others — members to the — to the Human Rights Council. So we will continue to — to work on this.

But I do — I do think the one point that I sometimes gets missed in this larger conversation is the fact that despite this challenge on membership and who’s on the — who’s on the Council, more often than not, those things that reflect our core values, our resolution that are passed usually by consensus.

CICILLINE: And are there suggestions that you can make or would you share with us some of the things you’re already doing to encourage member states that have better human rights records to — to participate what’s the reluctance, what — what can we do, what is the United States doing to encourage other states to participate.

HARPER: Congressman, with your permission, I’m going to turn that over to…

CICILLINE: Sure.

HARPER: …because she’s closer on this particular issue. Thanks.

BARCLAY: Sure. As I said, we — we proactively look for countries and seek out countries and conversation to run for the Council who have good and solid human rights records and who share our values.

And — and sometimes as I said, you know, they have very small diplomatic missions in Geneva. It’s a very expensive place to have diplomatic missions. And so, you know, our support might be in our own experience for running for the Council. Our support might be in sharing the need to find other friends and partners who share their values to work on the — on the vote whipping process to get elected.

Much of it is experiential. Much of it is sharing how — you know, what our experience has been and what we’ve seen other countries’ experience. And I think that both the — the practical information but also sort of moral support is important to these countries especially small ones who are trying to break into this space to be actors, productive, positive, affirmative actors in the Human Rights Council.

The U.S. standing with them is important both from a solidarity perspective as well as it is — as well as from a practical perspective of sharing our own experiences with them.

CICILLINE: And are there things that — in thinking about the challenges we face on the Council, are there things that you’ve experienced that would suggest that some actions we could be taking to make us more effective or make the Council more effective in addition to obviously membership and the removal of Israel as a permanent agenda item. But are there other challenges that we face in terms of the Council meeting its objective that — that you think might be addressed in some strategy that you’re pursuing? It’s sort of a more general question if there’s something we haven’t touched on.

BARCLAY: Then I can start and then I’d ask my colleagues. I mean, one of the things we started doing over the course of the last year or so as the workload has proliferated in Geneva, but yet bandwidth on all sides is not proliferated is to do a better job internally with our own agenda prioritizing where to spend limited resources during Council sessions. And that doesn’t mean dropping some on the cutting room floor not paying any attention to them, but is figuring out internally, you know, where — what are our A, B, and C priorities for a particular session, how can we bring other friends and partners in to do some of the things that they are already intending to do but in a stronger leadership role so that we can focus our efforts in other places.

Some of it is just very practical in terms of what’s coming up in the June session, what are our top 10 priorities, who else is playing on these bottom 10 priorities that are still priorities but need some other country to take the leadership role.

(Inaudible) have…

HARPER: It’s an excellent question, and we constantly try to think of new ways to improve the product and you mentioned South Sudan. That was an example of — of a situation in which it was very challenging to get the African group, which has 13 voting members of the Council so it’s very — it’s a challenge if you don’t have them with you supporting a resolution. So we went from a situation where they weren’t going to support much of a resolution on South Sudan to which — to — to a situation where this — in this recent session they supported the creation of a Commission investigating the human rights abuses in South Sudan.

And I think a lot of that is working with countries and helping them understand that just because it’s South Sudan today doesn’t mean it’s you tomorrow that we — especially countries that have political will. We think an approach of trying to build institutional capacity and provide technical assistance may be a better way to actually improve human rights on the ground than condemning them.

And — and yet there are other situations like South Sudan, like Sudan and — and numerous others, the North — North Korea certainly and Iran where they have demonstrated a complete lack of political will. And in those circumstances, we have to have an approach that shines a very bright spotlight on the human rights violations that are occurring. So a lot of this is to sort of — you know, how do utilize the resources of the Council so that we are finding the worse situations in ensuring that we’re getting the most accurate reporting and — and having the biggest spotlight because what we know is that human rights violators and abusers don’t like to do it in the spotlight. They like to do it in the darkness. And so it is our obligation then to have that spotlight created. And that’s what we’re trying to do over — over time in as many situations that call for as possible.

CICILLINE: Thank you. And just one final question. You — I want to congratulate you on the great work that you did in 2014 with the very historic LGBT resolution, and I’d love to hear a little more about kind of what that process was like. You know, there was a report required what you think is likely to follow from that.

As you well know, this is (inaudible) where there is tremendous evidence of incredibly horrific human rights abuses all around the world for people because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. I know that was a difficult resolution to get through and interested to know kind of what the impact has been since the passage of the resolution and the preparation of the report and what you think the Human Rights Council is likely to do in terms of implementation of any actions in response to this — surfacing this very serious human rights issue.

HARPER: Congressman, you’re absolutely correct. This is among the most important issues that we have addressed at the Council. We now had two resolutions of the past. The first — the second one passed with a greater margin in support of the first one, so that’s a good sign, an encouraging sign. And from those resolutions have come two report from OHCHR that have documented with great specificity the abuses that are going on as far as discrimination and violence against LGBTI persons around the world.

The United States perspective on this is that at — at some point in the very near future we should have the regularization of this as a agenda item prisoners of the Council through the passage of a resolution that seeks some kind of a mandate.

We are not in the core group. We heavily support this, but we are glad that our partners in Latin America are — Latin America are actually the leaders of the resolution because I think that sort of — that gives it a different kind of credibility among some states. And — and it makes it harder for states to say that this is somehow the United States kind of dictating the cultural policy around the world.

And so we’re heavily supportive and we’re encouraging and working closely with them. And we hope in the very near future they will seek to run a resolution that we will work to try to get passed with the highest possible vote margin. We could not agree with you more that this is among the most important developments that we’ve seen at the Council, and we support it 100 percent.

CICILLINE: Thank you very much. And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman. We will have follow-up questions. We’ll send them to you in writing and there might be other members who couldn’t make it today with the questions. We’ll send those to you in writing. We ask you to please respond. Thank you very much for your testimony and your time, your patience today.

And with that, I’ll dismiss the first panel and call the second panel to the witness table. I’ll introduce them in the order that they will make their presentations while they come forward.

First of all, Dr. Mark Lagon — Lagon. He’s president of Freedom House from 2010 through 2014. Lagon was the chair for Global Politics and Security at Georgetown University. He has master of Science and Foreign Service program, adjunct senior fellow for Human Rights at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was previously executive director and CEO of the leading anti-human trafficking nonprofit, Polaris. He earlier served at the State Department as U.S. ambassador-at-large directing the Office to monitor and combat trafficking of persons from 2007 to 2009. He was also previously deputy assistant secretary at the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs with responsibility for human rights, humanitarian issues, and United Nations reform.

Secondly, Ted Piccone is a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and Latin American initiative in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. His research is focused on global democracy and human rights policies, U.S.-Latin American relations including Cuba, emerging powers and multilateral affairs. Previously, he served as the acting vice president and director from 2013 to 2014 and deputy director from 2008 to 2013 of the Foreign Policy Program. Piccone is the author of Five Rising Democracies: And the Fate of the International Liberal Order.

Thirdly, Hillel Neuer is the executive director of United Nations Watch Human Rights Group based in Geneva, Switzerland. Since 2009 he’s chaired the Annual Geneva Summit for Human Rights, a gathering of dissidents organized by 25 NGOs. An expert on the U.N. Human Rights Council, he has addressed every one of its 31 regular sessions since 2006. And Neuer has published widely on international law and human rights. He’s appeared in debates on CNN, BBC, (inaudible).

And finally, Marc Limon is the executive director of the Universal Rights Group. Previously, Mark worked as a diplomat rank of counselor at the U.N. Human Rights Council from the body’s establishment in 2006 until the end of 2012, and this included participating in the negotiations on the institution building package, which determine how the Council would operate on the Council’s midterm review and on a wide range of thematic and country-specific issues over the course of 21 regular sessions and 19 special sessions. And during his time as a diplomat on the Council, Marc consistently worked to improve the body’s effectiveness, visibility and accessibility.

Welcome. Thank you for coming today. Thank you for your patience.

So, Mark Lagon will go first with you.

LAGON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you including me in this hearing.

Ten years in is an apt juncture to make a dual assessment of the Council and U.S. influence and improving it. That dual assessment, in my view, ought to look at five areas. First, country-specific work.

In the Bush administration, we were deeply worried that the Council would actually address country-specific situations less often that its dysfunctional predecessor. Moreover, the Council retained the Commission’s unfair practice of only one country having an institutionalized place in the body’s agenda, namely Israel. The number of resolutions, special sessions, and Commissions of Inquiry inflating alleged rights infringements to the level of atrocities devoted to the Middle East’s only democracy is grossly disproportionate.

Active membership by the United States has, however, contributed to successes in country-specific work. I would never have thought ten years ago that a resolution devoted to Iran could be passed not only in New York, but in Geneva as well.

The Human Rights Council resolution has sustained a Special Rapporteur when the international community and the United States, frankly, have prioritized nuclear proliferation as the pretext for deprioritizing human rights in that country.

While the Security Council has been all too inert on the atrocities of Assad in Syria, allowing ISIS to grow as a second source of atrocities, the Human Rights Council has repeatedly addressed the situation.

On Sri Lanka, after the United States got on the Council, there was a pronounced shift in the substance of resolutions, demanding accountability for mass atrocities committed in its civil war. And now Sri Lanka is making progress. A ray of hope in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World survey, which has been showing 10 years of straight global recession of democracy.

Most striking was the Commission of Inquiry launched by the Council on North Korea. No single multilateral mandate or report on human rights has changed the terms of debate more than that effort led by Australian jurist Michael Kirby. So powerful was it that China and Russia couldn’t block North Korea’s human rights situation from being added to the U.N. Security Council’s standing agenda.

The United States may not end the qualitative and quantitative tilt of the Council’s treatment of Israel, but its presence is helpful.

Second area I want to talk about is thematic work of the Council, which has been ameliorated by the U.S. leadership as well.

United States’ other folks who have testified here helped turn around a perverse set of resolutions on defamation of religion — I know you’re ceased with that, Mr. Chairman — the religious freedom issue (inaudible), those defamation of religion resolutions had given cover to states to repress religion — freedom of religion and expression.

The victory that the United States brought about is precarious and vulnerable as the single most pronounced voice for freedom of worship and freedom of expression in the international community. The United States should be on the Council.

Second, a much-needed mandate was created for freedom of assembly and freedom of association, in large part because of U.S. leadership at the Council. When atrocities and ostensible democracies worldwide are squeezing civil society, that mandate is essential.

A third area relates to the most distinctive innovation of the negotiation I played a small part in to create the Council, the Universal Periodic Review.

The UPR gives opportunity for civil society groups to shine a light of accountability on their states. It’s not widely known, but the largest part of Freedom House’s work is capacity-building and emergency assistance to civil society organizations in all regions of the world. And we see how the UPR helps our local civil society partners. A good example is Mali, where meetings developed between ministerial departments and representatives of civil society only because the UPR existed.

UPR is not an unvarnished success. It isn’t clear to me that there is a sufficient onus on states to live up to even the recommendations they agree to meet, much less those they don’t. That’s one of the reasons that Freedom House feels it’s important to take human rights defenders it works with and including those from Venezuela to the bodies that are designed to treat whether countries are living up to the human rights conventions that they make commitments to. They actually have more impact.

The fourth area is kicking the worst of the worst off the body. It’s commendable that this improvement upon the Commission that you could get rid of a member of the body who was so heinous was, in fact, invoked when Muammar Qaddafi threatened his own people and Libya was temporarily suspended from the Council.

A second expulsion would prove that it’s, in fact, a trend that would build credibility. And alas earlier this year, when the United States was taking its required year off the membership, the Council failed to bounce Burundi from its membership as atrocities were unfolding.

Fifth, and last, is the question of elections. The Council improved on the Commission in two respects. First, clean — so-called “clean slates” of candidates equaling the number of seats allotted to a region have been counteracted by the practice of transparent roll calls.

Secondly, states actually justify their candidacy with a platform. They speak to the merits of their record, and they make pledges. Neither these two improvements have been fool-proof. Regional groups have still put out clean slates. The Western Group has indeed put up clean slate. The United States has taken advantage of a clean slate. It should have the courage of its convictions that it will win by reasonable margins. Some states offer bogus rhetorical pledges and clearly reprehensible rights abusing states get on the Council.

In this regard, if I can make one major recommendation for U.S. policy, the U.S. should prove that it will subject an ostensible strategic ally to the same standards as other horrific autocracies and not only oppose, but lead a campaign against Saudi Arabia or once these gender apartheid and heinous religious persecution.

I offer three conclusions.

The United States, being on the body, has improved the Human Rights Council. It’s offered real value including country-specific resolutions, thematic work, and the UPR.

Second, the very flaws and pathologies of the Council’s work argue not for boycotting it, but adding the United States’ considerable weight to counteracting them.

And third and finally, let’s look at the dynamics of the Council. We know that solidarity among the democracies will not spontaneously come from the emerging powers of the Global South that my friend, Ted, writes about frequently — Brazil, South Africa, India. Freedom House’s own report Supporting Democracy Abroad demonstrates that.

The U.S. and Europe are — have much more of a forward-leaning approach on democracy and human rights, and we shouldn’t think the E.U. should be expected to efficaciously lead the world’s democracies without the United States there.

So, in short, let’s get out of our funk. The United States has plenty of soft power and moral authority to offer on human rights. The Human Rights Council needs it. With the United States on it, the Human Rights Council is a glass half full rather than a glass half empty.

Thank you.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes Mr. Piccone for your opening statement.

PICCONE: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Many thanks for inviting me to present some thoughts about the Human Rights Council on its 10-year anniversary and the role of the U.S. leadership on the body.

You know, many of us were skeptical that the outcome of the debates to create the Council in 2006 were unbalanced, positive or negative. But we also knew from the start that meeting the new Council standards could require ongoing attention and pressure from Washington and civil society from around the world. So I applauded President Obama’s decision to join the Council after the previous administration decided to sit down on the sidelines during those first crucial years. And I would argue it’s fair to say U.S. leadership has made a major contribution to the successes of the Council since it joined the body in 2009.

Late last year, I compiled my own accounting of the Council’s first ten years based on, I think, misunderstandings that continue to plague perceptions of its work. And I just completed a study of the Council’s record on monitoring country-specific situations that demand greater attention by the U.N. And I request that those documents be entered into the Commission’s record.

PITTS: Without objection, so ordered.

PICCONE: My assessment covers five main issues that continue to burden the Human Rights Council.

First, we’ve heard a lot about the Council’s membership. We all agree, I think, that some members of the Council do not — to put it mildly — represent the shining stars of the human rights universe. In particular, election of states like China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela, and newer members like Burundi and Ethiopia, is a sad testament to the General Assembly’s willingness to prioritize over principles.

But it is not the case that the majority of the Council’s members are authoritarian. From 2007 to 2015, over 74 percent of the Council’s members met the Freedom House standards of free and partly free. In addition, other states with notorious human rights records — Iran, Sudan, Syria, Azerbaijan and Belarus, for example — have either failed in their campaigns to win a seat or have withdrawn in the face of heavy opposition.

The problem with the membership process is two-fold. First, too often the regional slate is not competitive, giving states little to no choice when electing members. And second, some member states just don’t want the trouble and expense involved in Council membership. Third, other big democracies elected to the body, like India, and Indonesia, and South Africa, too often avoid criticizing fellow governments or even worse.

And so the United States has continued to work very hard to persuade more democratic states to join or become more positively engaged on the Council. But a democracy (inaudible) is not enough. You also need to have sufficient understanding of how the international system can work to promote human rights.

Finally, I think it’s ultimately a question of peer pressure, the way the U.N. works that there needs to be peer pressure from other governments, but also bottom-up from citizens. And we need to continue to build cross-regional coalitions of likeminded states, which requires really active engaged diplomacy in Geneva, in New York, and in capitals.

The ten-year anniversary is a good moment to reflect on other ways membership can be improved.

First, the Office of the High Commissioner should issue an annual report on if and how each candidate is cooperating with the Council. That is a criterion for membership.

Secondly, regional groups could commit to run only on competitive slates.

Third, states could organize a formal pledging conference to make the specific commitment to uphold human rights.

And then finally I would point out on membership, we’re never going to get a perfect membership.

The diverse membership of the Council means it speaks with some legitimacy when it does, in fact, take action against violations in specific situations. So in the last session we saw unanimous resolutions — all states, unanimous resolutions North Korea, Myanmar and South Sudan. I think that speaks very powerfully in the — in the way about what’s going wrong in those countries in the international communities to use.

Second big issue, country-specific scrutiny by the Council. There’s an impression that the body spends too much time on these “soft” thematic resolutions and not enough condemning systematic violations in specific countries. It’s true that the balance is much more in favor of thematic resolutions. But if we look at all the relevant mechanisms of the Council, it’s much more than just resolutions. We look at country visits and reports by Special Rapporteurs, special sessions, Commissions of Inquiry, the new Universal Periodic Review process, not to mention treaty bodies. We see a much higher level of attention to country situations, including the worst cases.

The Universal Periodic Review, which has received 100 percent participation by all U.N. member states, has yielded an unprecedented global examination of every states’ human rights performance.

I would add that these soft thematic resolutions often include mandates that are some of the most important tools the U.N. has to investigate states on everything from torture to human trafficking, to freedom of religion, arbitrary detentions. And these rapporteurs go in to state and monitor and speak out about the violations in those countries.

It doesn’t mean that the most important cases are getting all the attention they deserve, but this is a function of power politics and a lack of time and resources. One remedy would be to allow other credible stakeholders a voice in triggering the country situation examinations.

Third, let me jump to the problem of Council’s biased treatment of Israel.

As this Congress is well aware, Israel’s human rights record is the only country-specific permanent item on the agenda, which was a result of some bad bargaining in the early days of the Council, when the United States was inactive. And I think you’ve already won’t repeat what you already heard in the first panel about how it’s changed from the time when the United States was off the Council and since then, it’s already in my testimony.

Now, not surprisingly, Israel approaches the Council with trepidation and routinely fails to cooperate with its fact-finding commissions, but it has not walked away from the — the Council or from the UPR process.

As Israel’s Ambassador to Geneva stated, “Israel came to the UPR review with respect for the process, belief in the importance of its universality and cooperative nature, and with great pride in its achievements.”

I think the United States must continue to fight hard for fair treatment of Israel in Geneva. I think also Israel could do more to cooperate with the Council’s mechanisms. This is a bit of chicken and egg problem here. But experience shows we’re much better off staying engaged with the Council to defend Israel against the unfair treatment than walking away from it.

A fourth issue is that the U.N. is a toothless debating society and has no real impact. And as we heard in the first panel, we know from human rights defenders on the ground that actually it has real meaning when the international community speaks out against violations in specific countries. And we don’t want to fall into the trap that says, “Oh, this is all just talk and the universal declaration and treaties don’t really matter.” There has been real — real impact.

The real challenge is implementation of the norms that we already have on the table. And accountability for human rights violations starts by shedding light on a variety of pressing human rights problems. And we see this explosive increase in the scope and depth of the Council’s work over the last 10 years and it demonstrates a much more systematic attempt by the international community to monitor state behavior.

The Council has established 20 new mandates of independent experts that act as its eyes and ears on the ground. And my research, which covers the effectiveness of these monitors revealed dozens of stories of the impact they’ve had in getting prisoners released, in protecting journalists, in decriminalizing blasphemy, and reducing prison sentences. And in addition, we now have the UPR process, which is adding another layer of transparency and accountability, and nearly half of their recommendations made to states were fully or partially implemented just two-and-a-half years after the first round of reviews.

I won’t go into what has happened on North Korea, and Sri Lanka, and Syria. I think that was already well-covered in the previous speakers. I would just underscore that greater documentation of abuses is only the first step toward real accountability.

The Council and the Commissioner for Human Rights need — need real resources to do the field work that are necessary to build up both the documentation and the implementation work that so desperately needed.

Fifth issue and particularly relevant to this hearing is U.S. leadership at the Council. Some argue that the body is so tainted by politics and spoilers that we would be better off staying away from it. But I think this approach would abandon the field to those who remain determined to block any scrutiny or condemnation of human rights. We know the evidence against U.S. withdrawal. Its absence from the Council during the first two years led to setbacks, including the preponderant focus on Israel.

Since the United States joined in 2009, the Council has taken a string of important actions that move the agenda forward on North Korea, Iran, Syria, thematic priorities that we heard about in the first panel. And just in this last session alone, the U.S. played a key role in securing positive action on the right to peaceful protest, South Sudan, Myanmar, Iran, Syria and North Korea, and the joint statement on — on China. So the U.S. needs to stay engaged, and I think the record proves it well.

I want to raise one last issue, which is the participation of civil society at the Human Rights Council, which is critical.

To me, it’s the lifeblood of what makes this system works because if human rights defenders and other very well-experienced advocates who push governments and hold them accountable to what these principles mean, already the Council is quite often to civil society, but there are several problems.

NGO representatives invited to speak are routinely interrupted with harassing points of order from repressive delegations. There are reprisals against defenders advocates who cooperate with the Council’s mechanisms. I think the state’s failure to address these reprisals should disqualify it from sitting on the Council.

And then finally, there’s a committee in New York called the U.N. Committee on NGOs that certifies where an NGO can participate. We have to desperately reform this committee. If Congress wants to improve this situation and it should instruct our diplomats to demand a complete overhaul of the accreditation system, take it out of the hands of diplomats, and put it in the hands of professional experts who are qualified to make the assessments needed to give civil society a greater voice at the U.N.

Many thanks for your attention. I look forward to your questions.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman. Very constructive.

Mr. Neuer, you’re recognized for your opening statement.

NEUER: Chairman Pitts, Chairman McGovern, distiguished Members of the Commission:

Thank you for your leadership in defending human rights around the world, and for inviting me to testify on the UN Human Rights Council, the role of the US, and possibilities for reform. I also want to recognize the outstanding work of Ambassador Keith Harper, and his team at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, in advancing human rights, helping us at UN Watch to give a voice to victims, and, when we and our dissidents are so often interrupted at the Council, for defending our right to speak.
We meet on the 70^th anniversary of the UN Commission on Human Rights, whose creators gathered this week, in May 1946, in the aftermath of the Nazi atrocities. Eleanor Roosevelt, the great humanitarian of the age, became the founding Chair, and Rene Cassin, the eminent legal philosopher, the Vice-Chair.
The founders had a dream: to reaffirm the principle of human dignity, and to guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
Sadly, however, over time the UN changed. Dictatorships joined and hijacked the Commission—even electing the murderous regime of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi as Chair. Nineteen forty-six, Eleanor Roosevelt; 2003, Colonel Qaddafi.
That was the last straw which prompted UN Secretary-General Annan to call for eliminating the Commission. He said member states were there not to strengthen human rights but to shield their records of abuse. The commission, he said, suffered from politicization, selectivity, declining professionalism, and a credibility deficit—all of which, in Annan’s words, “cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.”
By contrast, the UN promised that the new body would elect members committed to human rights, and address the world’s most severe abuses.
Ten years later, we ask: Has the new council remedied the fatal flaws identified by Secretary-General Annan? Is it living up to the UN’s promise of reform, and to the original dream, from 70 years ago, of Eleanor Roosevelt?
Let us consider the council’s record in responding to gross violations. Thanks to the U.S., an important inquiry was created on North Korea. Yet over fifty sessions, only a tiny minority of countries have been condemned — less than what even the discredited old Commission accomplished.
To the vast majority of abusers, the council grants impunity. In China, 1.3 billion people are denied freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion. Nobel peace laureate Liu Xiabo languishes in prison, as does democracy pioneer Wang Binzhang. Tibetans are trampled and tortured. The council’s response? Over the past 10 years, not one resolution, special session, or commission of inquiry. No protection for one-fifth of the world’s population. On the contrary, in violation of the criteria guaranteed in the council’s 2006 charter, China was elected as a member.
In Russia, journalists and dissidents are harrassed, arrested, even assassinated. Vladimir Putin’s regime has sparked deadly wars, invading Ukraine and swallowing Crimea. The council’s reponse? Silence. Over ten years, the council never attempted to pass a single resolution on Russia—when even the discredited commission managed to adopt two. Nor did the council create a single special session, monitor or inquiry. On the contrary: Russia, too, was elected a member.
In Saudi Arabia, women are subjugated, Christians are arrested for practicing their religion, democracy blogger Raif Badawi was sentenced to 10 years in prison and a thousand lashes, and beheadings are at an all time high. The council’s response? Silence. A recent attempt to investigate Saudi Arabia’s carpet bombing of Yemeni civilians was quashed. On the contrary: Saudi Arabia, too, was elected a member.
And faced with compelling reports—by the U.S. State Department—of torture in Algeria, forced child labor in Congo, attacks on dissidents in Cuba, abuse of foreign workers in Qatar, incommunicado detentions in the United Arab Emirates, the imprisonment of Caracas mayor Antonio Ledezma and other democracy leaders in Venezuela, and arbitary arrests in Vietnam, what has the council done, over its ten years, to protect these victims?
Absolutely nothing. On the contrary: the UN elected every single one of these abusers as a council member.
With 62% of the current membership failing the basic standards of a free society, the Council’s democracy credentials are, in 2016, the lowest in history.
If the founders were alive today, would they not be revolted by the perversion of their dream, and of their creation.
Let us consider the Council’s new Universal Periodic Review, which purports to examine every country. While the U.S. uses it to apply real scrutiny, the vast majority abuse it to praise each other. I was there when China praised Saudi Arabia for respecting religious freedom, and when the next day Saudi Arabia praised China for respecting minority rights. That’s why our detailed study, available at unwatch.org, is entitled Mutual Praise Society.
Let us consider where the Council is active. Despite the promise of ending selectivity, the Council’s pathological obsession with demonizing Israelis, and denying their human rights, has never been worse. Since its creation, the council has adopted 67 resolutions condemning Israel—and only 61 on the rest of the world combined. The resolutions on Israel are uniquely suffused with political hyperbole, selective reporting, and the suppression of any countervailing facts that might provide balance in background information or context.
Its commissions of inquiry like the Goldstone Report, which exonerated Hamas, initiated a new era whereby a terrorist group has come to rely on the Council as an international tool in its war against Israel. Knowing that the Council will condemn Israel based on a false effects-based evaluation of targeting judgments, Hamas been incentivized by the UN to launch rocket attacks against Israeli civilians while placing its own civilian population in harm’s way.
And just now, in March, the council instituted a new UN black-list of companies doing business across the 1949 armistice line, to have the UN implement the anti-Israeli BDS campaign — boycott, divestment and sections. By legitimizing coercive measures akin to the Arab Boycott of Israel, the Council now seeks to strangle the economic life of Israeli citizens. 
Let us consider the Special Rapporteurs and other experts appointed by the Council. A number do important work, such as Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, the expert on Iran. But far too many are wolves in sheep’s clothing, appointed by the dictatorships to pursue radical agendas in the name of human rights.
In 2008, they appointed Richard Falk, a leading promoter of the 9/11 conspiracy theory and a suppporter of Hamas. I applaud National Security Advistor Susan Rice for condemning his poisonous words when she was Ambassador to the UN.
In 2013, despite objections by Ambassador Samantha Power and the Swiss parliament, they re-elected Jean Ziegler, co-founder of the Muammar Qaddafi Human Rights Prize, an award given to Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrkhan, and anti-Semites and Holocaust deniers such as Roger Garaudy. Ziegler is the longest-serving Council expert, and himself received this award.
In 2014, when Richard Falk’s term was up, the council went ahead and appointed his wife and colleague, Hilal Elver, who, as the US objected, espouses equally inflammatory views.
In 2015, the council made Idriss Jazairy a UN human rights expert, even though, when he was Algeria’s ambassador, he personally led an aggressive campaign of nom-democracies to muzzle UN rights experts.
Who selects them? Last year the head of the committee that shortlists canddates was the representative of Saudi Arabia. Yes, he was the one interviewing
If Eleanor Roosevelt were alive, would she not agree that selecting the Saudi regime was, in the words of Reporters Without Borders, grotesque?
Mr. Chairman, we are actually about to mark a third anniversary. Next month, Geneva will celebrate the 200^th anniversary since Mary Shelley and her husband joined Lord Byron and others at the Villa Diodati, situated right across the lake from where the Council is today.
In that cold and gloomy June of 1816, amid the darkness, and storms of thunder and lightning, they exchanged ghost stories. Mary Shelley had a nightmare, which she famously wrote down as the story of an idealistic student in Geneva who tried to create life, the story of Frankenstein.
I often walk past Villa Diodati, on the beautiful hills of Cologny. When I gaze across Lake Geneva and see the UN Human Rights Council,  I cannot help but wonder: If the creators, Eleanor Roosevelt and Rene Cassin, were alive and at their would they not behold a sight that is grotesque, a fiend, a monster? Would not they be revolted by the fiend that has become of their creation? Would they not conclude that the UN Human Rights Council has become Frankenstein’s monster?

Mr. Chairman, I believe the U.S. and fellow democracies can and must fight back, as outlined in my written testimony, and about which I will be happy to elaborate. Thank you.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman.

Mr. Limon, you’re recognized for your opening statement.

LIMON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to thank members of the Commission for inviting me to participate in this hearing. I will use the few minutes available to try to both look back at the Council’s achievements and shortfalls over the past 10 years and forward to consider possible future reforms of the body.

Turning first to performance of the Council. I would offer two ways to analyze and understand that performance, one by looking at the broad — broad linear trends and two by undertaking the comparative analysis of the Council’s work as measured against its founding document, in particular, G.A. Resolution 60/251.

Seen in a linear sense, the first decade of the Council can be divided, I think and I would suggest into four phases. First, a difficult yet in the end relatively successful birth, i.e., agreements on the Council’s institution-building package; a birth that took place largely in the absence of U.S. engagement; a point which goes a long way towards explaining the main defects of the IBP, namely, the decision to devote an entire agenda item as we have heard to Israel.

Two, the second phase, an extremely difficult first three to four years. Those of us who were there will remember those years, during which time the U.S. still remained largely disengaged.

During that time, the Council was dominated and essentially controlled by a small group of states including Algeria, Egypt, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. These states use their coordinatorships of the Africa Group, the OIC, and the NAM (ph) to dictate the Council’s decision-making and output. This early period reached (inaudible) when the Council convened a special session on Sri Lanka and as we have heard ended by congratulating the (inaudible) government, in effect, for committing war crimes.

The third phase saw a rapid upturn in fortunes with the decision of the U.S. to join the Council in 2009. With the support of various moderate developing countries and its western partners, the U.S. was able to loosen the grip of the countries I mentioned a few moments ago.

During this time, the Council scored important achievements vis-a-vis the situations in Libya, Sri Lanka, Eretria, North Korea, and Iran. And in the context of non-development in areas such as combating religious intolerance, freedom of assembly, sexual orientation, and business and human rights. The U.S. was key to all of these achievements.

The last phase lasted roughly for the past two years and has been characterized by the reconfiguration of the aforementioned NAM OIC countries this time together with Russia and the new block known as the “Likeminded Group.” This reemergence has coincided with a series of very divisive votes on issues around sexual orientation, gender identity and the protection of civil society space.

The second framework to understand the Council over the past 10 years, I would suggest is a comparative analysis based on measurement against G.A. Resolution 60/251.

In the short time available to me, I will restrict myself to addressing a few key areas where the Council has fallen short in my opinion of its mandate.

First, as we have heard the core mandate of the Council is to address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations. However, after 10 years of existence there are significant question marks over whether the Council is fulfilling this core mandate.

URG’s analysis, which has been made available to the Commission shows that only around 8 percent of the Council’s resolutions are considered unadopted and writing for, i.e., situations requiring the Council’s attention. Even if one includes resolutions adopted under other relevant agenda items, then still only around a quarter of the Council’s substantive output is focused on the supposedly core mandate of the Council.

What is more, that output has addressed only around a dozen situations under Item 4, nearly all of them in Africa or the Middle East. It has also placed, as we have heard, a heavily disproportionate focus around 60 resolutions on Israel. This suggests the Council’s attention is directed more by geopolitical considerations than by — to quote the IBP — the principles of impartiality, objectivity, and non-selectivity as it should be.

It is a similar story with Council mechanisms notwithstanding the welcome emergence of new mechanisms like Commissions of Inquiry. The Council has not been able to arrest the historic decline in the number of country-specific special procedures.

Finally, the Council has not even begun to implement Paragraph 5F of G.A. Resolution 60/251, which makes clear that the Council shall — and I quote, “contribute through dialogue and cooperation towards the prevention of human rights violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies.”

A second core mandate of the Council as set by world leaders is to promote the full implementation of human rights obligations undertaken by states. The importance of implementation and follow-up for the effectiveness and credibility of the Council has been mentioned today and is fully reflected in G.A. Resolution 60/251, which states and I quote, the methods of work of the Council shall be results-orientated, allow for subsequent follow-up discussions to recommendations and their implementation, and allow for substantive interaction with special procedures and mechanisms.

Unfortunately, while the past 10 years has seen a huge increase in the number of resolutions adopted, from around 70 in 2008 to over 110 in 2014, a similarly huge increase in the number of recommendations to states by Council mechanisms, and a big increase in the number of generic thematic debates, reports, and panels. There is little evidence of systematic follow-up on the implementation of all of those recommendations and — and proposals. It is vital for the Council’s credibility that this trend is reversed so that we can finally together bridge the long-standing implementation gap.

Finally, Mr. Chair, I would end by offering a few thoughts on areas for improvements in reform over the next 10 years.

First, in order to improve its relevance and credibility, the Council must deal in a more systematic, principled, and objective manner with situations of human rights violations especially systematic and gross violations. To do so, we’ll require political will and creativity, and the U.S. delegation will necessarily (inaudible) play key role as it has up until now.

Two, linked without pointing at the Council will need to put in place the processes and mechanisms to more effectively prevent the escalation of violations and human rights emergences. And ideas in that regard have been mentioned this afternoon such as objective criteria that would trigger action by the Council, new mechanisms to oversee country situations and compare them with those objective criteria, and perhaps new mechanisms to undertake preventative missions.

Three, the Council will need to play a much more proactive role in promoting the implementation of universal norms, both by holding states accountable against their obligations and by delivering effective capacity-building and technical support. But then so now, in my opinion, the Council has done neither satisfactorily.

Four, U.N. regular budgetary funding for the human rights pillar must clearly be increased beyond the current three percent. Support should also be given to the High Commissioners change initiative.

Five, membership of the Council must, as we have heard, be improved. At present, the membership criteria contained in G.A Resolution 60/251 are largely ignored. With states, including Western states, voting on the basis of bilateral relationships rather than on the basis of the human rights performance of candidates. Ideas to improve this could be a voluntary — voting countries pledge or as we — the Congressman suggested, the U.S. and others publicly opposing certain candidatures.

And lastly, the Council should remain open to dissenting views, the voice of civil society, NGOs and national human rights institutions. At present, some states are trying to reduce civil society space and to turn the Council and its mechanisms such as the UPR into an effective peer-to-peer, friend-to-friend mutual appreciation society. It’s imperative for the future of the Council and its credibility that the U.S. continues to lead efforts to oppose such (inaudible) stifle descent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PITTS: The Chair thanks the gentleman, thanks each of the witnesses for your testimony. I’ll begin questioning and recognize myself for that purpose.

Dr. Lagon, what in your view are the major human rights issues and situations that the Council should be addressing? In — in what ways do actions or inactions by U.N. bodies including Human Rights Council affect these situations? If you would elaborate on that.

LAGON: Well, to be brief I’d — I’d say my colleague, Hillel Neuer, points at the right thing that China and Russia as permanent five members of — of the Security Council, they have not been subject to scrutiny. And the huge portion of the world’s population in China is not subject to scrutiny beyond Universal Periodic Review. That may have more to — to do with a norm in the U.N. that P5 countries are — are left be or the influence of those countries.

If you ask me what situation in the world deserves the most focus, it’s Syria and it has gotten the Human Rights Council. So why is it that the work of the Human Rights Council on North Korea is actually managed to influence shockingly the — the Security Council and to keep an agenda item on — on human rights, but there hasn’t been an enormous influence in shaking the Security Council to take action in a bubbling, boiling set of atrocities in Syria. So I want to think about the relationship of — of the bodies, so there’s inaction or there is inefficacy of bodies that speak and then it doesn’t go forward.

PITTS: Would you please elaborate on the importance of the U.S. oppose the election of Saudi Arabia to the Council?

LAGON: I feel very strongly about this. Look, Saudi Arabia has a truly heinous record on women’s rights. That’s one reason why next Tuesday at our 75th anniversary celebration, Freedom House is going to be honoring with its Freedom Award, Hala Al Bazari (ph), an intellectual and blogger speaking up for women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. But that’s not the end of the story.

Religious persecution is appalling in Saudi Arabia. Freedom House documents the level of executions in Saudi Arabia rose to the highest level in 20 years last year. And let’s think about Saudi Arabia. It exports (inaudible) extremism by underwriting schools around the world. It has helped Bahrain squashed dissent brutally, and it’s used indiscriminate force in Yemen.

I asked the question, is this an ally in good standing of the United States? The United States will prove that it not only puts strategic competitors in the crosshairs of — on human rights if it stands up to — to fight Saudi Arabia. The United States and Saudi Arabia are sitting their year off from the Council as required by its rules. United States should not only fight to get back on the Council, but to fight for Saudi Arabia to be denied a seat.

PITTS: Thank you.

Mr. Piccone, in your written testimony you suggest that membership to the Council could be improved by states organizing a, quote, “formal pledging conference,” end quote, and committing to uphold the highest standards in protecting human rights. And you also suggest that regional groups can voluntarily commit to run only competitive slates. How would you suggest that states be incentivized to hold the conferences, and what incentives do members of regional groups have them run competitive slates?

PICCONE: Thank you very much for these questions. On the — on the pledging conference, I think the heart of it is to put on the table for all of the member states of the General Assembly to consider a balanced review of how these states are implementing human rights norms and cooperating with the Council, which is another criterion for membership.

And so if you started the conversation with, you know, this state has not allowed an independent expert to visit the country, has not submitted its (inaudible) reports, has not — other ways it has interfered with the promotion and protection of human rights. I think that kind of shedding light transparency, particularly if it’s then surrounded by some media attention and some society activism would cause some states to step back and say, “Oh, maybe I don’t want that scrutiny.”

I mean, whether Saudi Arabia tries to run for a higher profile, what it’s doing is only inviting more scrutiny on its own record as Freedom House’s testimony suggests. So, sometimes that give and take in the — in the halls of the U.N. and having more transparency about their records can lead to some changes on the margins. But I think at the end of the day, we have a fundamental problem in our international system, which is a — it’s put (inaudible) three baskets of states. The — the authoritarian hardliners who are really going to resist no matter what, and it’s very hard to have influence with them.

You have, I would say, more human rights — pro-human rights states that are abiding by the rule of law, the United States and Europe (inaudible) lead there. And then you have a vast group of middle states that swing in between the two. And I have found in my research that a number of those states are much more open influence by the international system. You have within those societies reformers who are willing to have the international scrutiny and use it as a stick and to leverage within their own societies to promote change.

In terms of incentivizing, I think the competitive slates, maybe in the next five or 10-year review of the Council you can force that issue. It would require a rule change in the institutional structure of the Council. It’s for now making it voluntary, certainly the U.S. should lead by example and it should be willing to submit itself to a competitive slate unlike the last time it ran. And I think we have to keep putting pressure, particularly on the African states.

Where there’s been a choice? Most of the time, the states have voted for — particularly it’s a question of power. The smaller states with bad records usually lose.

PITTS: Thank you.

Mr. Neuer, seven of the 24 Human Rights Council special sessions have focused on alleged Israeli human rights violations. You know, most people view this focus as imbalanced. How has this imbalance jeopardized the Council’s credibility?

NEUER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the selectivity against Israel was one of the flagship defects that Kofi Anan identified when he talked about selectivity and politicization. And indeed, one of the documents of the United Nations that were circulated around the time of the creation of the Council was the document talking about listing the special agenda item on Israel and its need to be removed. So I think certainly the United States and other countries the obsessive treatment of Israel is regarding as a very significant manifestation of the Council’s lack of credibility.

And I think there is — I think — we should acknowledge the work of the U.S. at the Council and certainly, I recognize the outstanding work of Ambassador Harper and his team at the U.S. Commission in Geneva in advancing human rights, helping us at U.N. Watch, give a voice for victims. And when we and our dissidents are so often interrupted at the Council for defending our right to speak, as we recognize their work on Israel.

At the same time, the — the — it would be unfortunate if the U.S. now finds itself in a position where they have to defend the Council’s work. For example, in the first panel, I didn’t hear a mention that in June 2010 there was the creation of an entirely new mechanism that didn’t exist before. This was the Flotilla incident off of Gaza when I haven’t had terrorist group tried to run the blockade and cause deaths.

The Council convened an urgent session, which they called an urgent debate because they were actually in session already. So they created an entirely new mechanism called an urgent debate, created a Commission of Inquiry, which was prejudicial. The verdict was declared in advance, which then produced an egregiously one-sided inquiry, which was — report, which was contradicted by the U.N. itself about a year later by Sir Jeffrey Palmer in the — in a more credible report that came out of New York.

And this significant attack on Israel, this urgent debate, Commission on Inquiry and report don’t seem to be factored in when the State Department does their numbers nor when we heard the number in the first panel of one-fifth of the resolutions to deal with Israel. These are entirely inconsistent with the resolution — the numbers that we count quite scrupulously. And I believe the difference is that we’re counting apples and oranges.

When we count, we look at condemnations, and we count many condemnations of Israel versus condemnations of other countries whereas the State Department seems to be counting all country resolutions. And that is not a meaningful metric because there are country resolutions that entirely praise those countries. For example, there was a resolution on Sudan, which, quote, “Welcome the commitment of the government of Sudan to protect and promote human rights in the country.” That seems to be one of the resolutions that the State Department is counting in their overall measure so to Resolution 29/24 in Cote D’Ivoire, which welcomes the exemplary and continuing cooperation of Cote D’Ivoire with the U.N. human rights machinery. It is not meaningful to account all country resolutions especially those that praise leaderships.

PITTS: Thank you.

Mr. Limon, in your testimony you mentioned the goal of main streaming the Human Rights Council. Would you elaborate on what this entails and the prospects of elevating the Council’s position as well as human rights as a whole within the U.N. framework?

LIMON: Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. It is a good question because nobody really understands what we mean by main streaming. It’s there and is a key part of G.A. Resolution 60/251. It’s actually an operative Paragraph 4. The Human Rights Council should lead efforts on main streaming.

It’s also incredibly important. If you bear in mind that the human rights pillars we’ve said only gets three percent of the U.N.’s regular budget, so it clearly needs to amplify those resources into — by promoting human rights across the other two pillars across development and security.

But the Human Rights Council has never really grasped with what that means in practice. It’s often referred to as the other parts of the U.N. should take a human rights-based approach, but again nobody has really ever defined what that is.

What, in my opinion, the Human Rights Council needs to do is become much better — becoming a forum where the different parts of the U.N. family can come together to discuss how human rights can be promoted through other U.N. policy areas, but also how other U.N. policy areas can be improved in terms of the qualities of impact by adopting a rights-based approach. A very good example of this at the moment, of course, is the discussions around the sustainable development goals.

Mr. Chairman, you probably heard that there were various efforts to include human rights more explicitly within the sustainable development goals. There was pushback against that from the same kind of states we’ve heard about today, but still the human rights are there. They’re in the preamble and they’re also there in ICG 16 about good governance and rule of law. So, it’s a legitimate — an important discussion to have for the Human Rights Council about what is the role of the human rights system in promoting the sustainable development goals, in particular, by promoting human rights and promoting the implementation of obligations.

And one thing that, you know, as a rights groups has proposed in that regard, we better have a thematic special session on human rights in the SDGs.

Another area of main streaming, of course, is human rights across the security pillar so that’s human rights missions as part of peacekeeping missions, but also greater connectivity between the Human Rights Council and the Security Council.

At an event this morning with Brookings and the High Commissioner of the Human Rights, we heard the High Commissioner admit that seven years ago human rights was not on the agenda of the Security Council, whereas now the High Commissioner for Human Rights regularly goes and briefs the Security Council about human rights situations. So there is — there are things happening in the area of main streaming, but this is one area, in my opinion. And for the past 10 years, the Council has not really grasped the scale of — of the importance of this — this mandate.

PITTS: Thank you. I have a question that I’d like all of you to respond to, and we’ll start with you, Dr. Lagon. What role do you see for NGOs at the Human Rights Council? And would you be able to elaborate on the challenges currently facing NGOs that attempt to participate in the Council’s deliberations?

LAGON: I thank you for asking that. Some of my colleagues have addressed this briefly earlier, I think it’s important not only for international NGOs like Freedom House to — to have a voice, but importantly, the NGOs from countries themselves that are being dealt with. And it’s — it’s a move forward from the Commission that the Universal Periodic Review gives voice to those civil society groups because they can access offer shadow reports or offer submissions that relate to Universal Periodic Review.

But when states cut off civil society organizations from being able to speak or, in New York, at the Accreditation Committee on the liberal states’ dictatorship purposefully target NGOs, asking them questions that are fanciful to try and prevent them from being accredited, when there are reprisals, when there are even Global South democracies who turn their heads away from those reprisals against civil society or bet them like the government of South Africa, that’s really unfortunate.

PITTS: Mr. Piccone?

PICCONE: Yes. On the challenges — well, to say a couple of points about — on the positive side of the ledger, I mentioned that there’s already more civil society participation in Geneva than in really any other part of the U.N. system. Overtime, there’s been developed a network of human rights organizations from the north and the south regional national groups, international groups that are working much more cohesively and coordinating common positions and joint statements on issues, and then lobbying back in their capitals with much greater authority than if it were just coming from Washington or New York, say Human Rights Watch or Amnesty.

This is a much more diverse and rich grouping of human rights groups that are actively lobbying their governments in the Global South as well as the Global North and that’s a positive development.

Also I would agree on the UPR process in my research, I’ve talked to many activists who say before the UPR process they couldn’t get their flip (ph) in the door with the government official to talk about human rights. Now, because the government has a concern about their reputation, they’re presenting their human rights records in Geneva. They’re willing to engage with civil society, coordinate across ministries, and with their groups in consulting them before they go to Geneva.

It’s a small step, but it’s where it begins in that kind of dialogue. It’s not only about naming and shaming.

On the challenges, I would mentioned, I mentioned reprisals is a major problem. And I think the High Commissioner and the last president of Human Rights Council, in particular, was very actively speaking out on that issue and trying to respond actively the cases where there are reprisals. And then the NGO Committee — I mean, some of us on this panel have got our own experience of harassment from the NGO Committee where states just ask over and over again the same questions just to string out and delay, and distract us from the hard work we’re trying to do on human rights issues. That’s why I call for a total overhaul of that body.

PITTS: Mr. Neuer?

NEUER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to agree with Ted that the rule of NGOs in Geneva at the Human Rights Council is a very significant opportunity for human rights victims from around the world to be heard. And certainly U.N. Watch, a big part of our work at the regular and special sessions is bringing those victims and giving them a platform even if they are so often insulted and harassed at the Council.

One issue, which I again want to emphasize is the Committee on NGOs headed by 19 governments. To our knowledge, the membership has never been more hostile. The membership includes Iran, Russia, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Venezuela, Turkey, Sudan, Burundi, Mortenia (ph) which has slavery, Nicaragua, Guinea, Azerbaijan. These countries are not just on the 19-member committee, they dominate that committee.

On typical votes, you might have 11 dictatorships or non-democracies and four or five democracies that vote the right way, a handful of democracies that either abstain or vote the wrong way. That is a critical stumbling block and it’s been mentioned for the U.S. and its allies need to invest more effort way in advance to ensure that that Committee has a different kind of composition so that NGOs are not presented from speaking at the U.N.

Second critical issue about NGOs is that most NGOs are doing great work. There are a handful of NGOs that are fake that are what we call GONGOS, governmental organized NGOs.

The Assad regime has an NGO that typically — regularly speaks to make its case. The genocidal regime of Sudan has several NGOs that make its case. These are all run by the regime. We did an event on Darfur and had a so-called NGO come and say that they’re from Darfur, and that no one should talk about Darfur because everything is fine there.

Finally, perhaps the most notorious incident, a couple of years ago we brought Tiana Wang (ph), the 24-year-old student whose father Wang Bejiang (ph) is the democracy pioneer imprisoned in China as a political prisoner. We brought her to speak at the Council and it emerged that while she was sitting among the NGOs there were Chinese agents wearing NGO badges, belonging to an accredited NGO who were spying on her or taking pictures of her, of her body, of her computer screen. They were caught by U.N. security.

These Chinese agents, they were taken outside, and I think for a day or two they had their credentials removed. But when we complained formally to the Council — and this was reported. There were two articles in the New York Times about this. The New York Times reporter in Beijing actually went to the address of the so-called NGO and it turns out it’s like the Chinese Pentagon where that NGO — so-called NGO is based. And there were no measures in response by the Council to China. And so this is something to be aware of have the NGO system is being subverted.

And just last year we saw Hamas, the terrorist group have a phony NGO based out of London called the Palestine Return Center. They got recognized as an NGO. Many democratic — democracy groups can’t be recognized, but a Hamas front group was recognized despite the efforts of the U.S. and many major democracies who try to vote against it. They have the majority with Iran and Sudan and they won. It’s something to be aware of.

PITTS: Thank you. Mr. Limon?

LIMON: Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. I would agree with Ted that we should — also remember the positive side of the ledger and that is the Geneva or the Human Rights Council are relatively open to NGO participation especially when compared with the General Assembly in New York. But clearly that space isn’t a threat and there’s more that can be done. I would highlight especially in that regard the Universal Periodic Review, which as we’ve heard today is held out now as a success story of the Human Rights Council. It’s first in years. And I agree that it is a success story.

However, we have — as we’ve heard it’s based on peer-to-peer review, which means that states themselves in the second round to submit information on whether or not they have implemented recommendations from the first round.

This — this information is then considered in the UPR working group without the participation of civil society and without the participation of the National Human Rights Institution. What does this mean in practice? It means that somebody mentioned earlier it’s kind of beauty pageant that states, say, we have done this, we have done that, and there’s no dissenting voice in the UPR working group.

Why? Evidence of that being a problem that according to the universal rights groups analysis, if we believe the state’s own reports under the UPR that around 50 percent of all recommendations they received in the first cycle were fully implemented and the further 20 percent of all recommendations were partially implemented, which in my estimation would make it the most successful compliance mechanism in the history of the U.N.

There’s something clearly not right and what’s not right in my opinion is that we don’t have that kind of shadow dissenting view. The NGOs can produce and do produce other stakeholders report, but that report is often ignored by states in the UPR working group.

Mr. Chair, you may be aware of the Human Rights Council is currently considering possible necessary reforms ahead of the third cycle of the UPR. And I would respectfully suggest that the U.S. should push for greater civil society involvement in the UPR working group to make sure that the dissenting view can be heard.

And just to express my agreement that the NGO Committee in New York, which accredits NGOs really is in need of complete overhaul. And the universal rights group is currently up in front of that NGO Committee, so I will tell you in a couple of weeks’ time just how much a need of overhaul it is (inaudible).

PITTS: Thank you very much. Very, very informative hearing. I don’t want to cut anyone off, but it’s five o’clock and we’re supposed to end.

Are — are there any concluding statements anyone wishes to make? If not — yes, Mister…

NEUER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PITTS: …Neuer.

NEUER: Yes. Once again I want to reiterate that U.N. Watch supports robust engagement to try to make the Council work to live up to the dream of its founders. At the same time, we think it’s important and we’ve published this before that the U.S. should not find itself in the position where it becomes an apologist for the Council’s worst abuses.

And as I detailed in written testimony on a number of occasions the U.S. has — seem to have adopted a rule whereby it needs to defend the actions of the Council. And I have in mind when the Saudi was elected to chair the committee that names human rights experts of the world. And Ambassador Power was asked about this. She said, “Well, it’s only procedural.”

Well, perhaps when the Congress confirms judges on the Supreme Court, that’s also our procedure. That’s an enormously influential position and the world was rightly outraged that the Saudi was given that — that job. So I — I think we see a dynamic where the U.S. needs to — feels the need to — to justify the things that are happening at the Council beyond that, which is truly defensible. Again, we appreciate engagement. We support it, but it should not be at the expense of critical engagement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PITTS: The Chair thanks all the witnesses for your testimony, very, very good contribution here today. I’d like to thank you and — and members of the Commission for their commitment to advocating for human rights (inaudible). But it’s clear that there is much work to be done after 10 years of operations, 31 regular sessions, 24 special sessions.

The U.N. Human Rights Council is yet to address some of the world’s most blatant human rights violations. China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, others appeared and received almost complete immunity, and the lack of a single resolution even introduced let alone passed against so many serious violators is a stark testament to the geopolitical considerations that often outweigh concerns for human rights at the Council. Yet, there’s cause for hope.

The action taken on Iran, Syria, Burma should not be forgotten. The recent robust investigation by the Commission of Inquiry and the atrocities committed in North Korea highlighted many gross and systematic abuses that had previously gone unacknowledged by the U.N. And these successes have a risk being overshadowed by the many other issues that the Council — a Council whose membership includes states like Vietnam and Venezuela, two nations well-known for forcefully suppressing freedom of speech.

Political liberties will never be accepted as credible. And the practice of clean slate election should be brought to an end so that genuine competition for membership requiring nations to demonstrate through action their commitment to protecting human rights can take place.

Furthermore, the critical role played by NGOs at the Council is under threat. The 19-member U.N. Committee on NGOs whose membership include Sudan and Iran is abusing its role in the NGO approval process to try and deter legitimate non-governmental organizations from participating in Council activities, and these efforts would muzzle our silence independent human rights monitors who provide a critical perspective to the Council’s deliberations.

I must commend Ambassador Harper, Deputy Assistant Secretary Barclay, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Busby for their earnest efforts to strengthen the U.S. leadership at the Council and address many of the concerns raised here today. It’s undoubtedly a difficult and thankless task.

And I must also recognize significant work of the NGOs here today who spend countless hours working to shine a light on the Council and improve its ability to effectively address some of the great concerns of our time.

I look forward to working with all of these distinguished individuals in the days ahead. Together, we can help strengthen U.S. leadership on the human rights fronts while encouraging the international community to prioritize the issues of fundamental freedoms, which we all hold dear.

Thank you very much for your participation and your attention. With that, this hearing is adjourned.